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ABSTRACT

Recent trends in the dynamics and character of the U.S. population, outlook for the remainder of 1980s, and prospects for long-term growth are reviewed. Estimated at 232 million as of mid-1982, the U.S. population is currently growing at about 1 percent/year, one of the developed world's highest growth rates. Natural increase (births minus deaths) still adds some 1.7 million people a year, despite the rapid post-baby boom fall in fertility to a near record low rate of 1.9 births/woman in 1981. With increasing numbers of refugees, net legal immigration averaged 600,000/year (1979-81) and the net inflow of illegal immigrants may now be 500,000/year, complicating projections of future U.S. population size. Currently, U.S. death rate and household size are at all-time lows. Rates of first marriage and remarriage are declining, while the divorce rate appears to have stabilized. More than half the population resides in the South and West. Rural areas and small towns grew faster than urban areas in the 1970s and for the first time in over a century. Educational attainment and labor force participation, are at all-time highs due to increasing employment among women and the baby boom generation's arrival at working ages. The age composition of the population, presents special problems for U.S. society. (Author/JN)

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U.S. Population: Where We Are; Where We're Going

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Abstract—This *Bulletin* reviews recent trends in the dynamics and character of the U.S. population, the outlook for the remainder of the 1980s, and prospects for long-term growth. Estimated at 232 million as of mid-1982, the U.S. population is currently growing at about 1 percent a year, one of the developed world's highest growth rates. Natural increase (births minus deaths) still adds some 1.7 million people a year, despite the rapid post-baby boom fall in fertility to a near-record low rate of 1.9 births per woman in 1981. With increasing numbers of refugees, net legal immigration averaged 600,000 a year in 1979-81 and the net inflow of illegal immigrants may now be 500,000 a year. Uncertainty over potentially large numbers of immigrants complicates projections of future U.S. population size. Currently, the U.S. death rate is at an all-time low. Rates of first marriage and remarriage are declining, while the divorce rate appears to have stabilized. Household size is at an all-time low. More than half the population now resides in the South and West. Rural areas and small towns grew faster than urban areas in the 1970s for the first time in over a century. Educational attainment is at an all-time high, as is labor force participation, due to increasing employment among women and the baby boom generation's arrival at working ages. The age composition of the population, with the bulge of the baby boom generation surrounded by the older "depression" generation born during the 1930s and the younger "baby bust" generation born since the end of the 1960s, presents special problems for U.S. society.

Editor: Jean van der Tak

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U.S. Population: Where We Are; Where We're Going

By Population Reference Bureau staff and guest experts

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Figure 1. United States: Census Regions and Divisions



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

U.S. Population: Where We Are; Where We're Going

By Population Reference Bureau staff and guest experts

About this Bulletin

This Bulletin *is designed to provide ready answers to questions that are among those most frequently asked of the Population Reference Bureau's information service: "What is/was/will be the U.S. population size/birth rate/death rate/immigration levels/marriage/divorce/labor force participation rates?" Nine PRB staff members helped to prepare it: Mary Barberis, Leon Bouvier, Barbara Bower, Patricia Cancellier, Cary Davis, Carl Haub, Arthur Haupt, Elaine Murphy, and Jean van der Tak, joined by H. Yuan Tien, PRB Visiting Scholar for 1981-82.*

The Bulletin *is enhanced by the contributions of six distinguished demographic experts in two special features. Calvin Beale (U.S. Department of Agriculture) takes an illuminating look at the "six demographic surprises of the 1970s" that will mark the past decade in U.S. population history. It was Calvin Beale's suggestion also that led to the February 17, 1982, panel discussion at PRB, which is summarized here, by himself, Leon Bouvier (PRB), Paul Glick (Bureau of the Census), Marilyn McMillen (Social Security Administration), Martin O'Connell (Bureau of the Census), and Jacob Siegel (Bureau of the Census) of "What's in store for U.S. population trends in the 1980s?"*

To supplement this Bulletin

THE UNITED STATES POPULATION DATA SHEET

This handy, three-color wall chart (18½" x 24") presents 24 columns of information on the U.S., the four census regions and nine divisions, 50 states, and the District of Columbia, including 1980 and 1970 census counts, 1990 projections, birth and death rates, migration, ethnic breakdowns, income, and population density. Copies may be ordered from the Population Reference Bureau, P.O. Box 35012, Washington, DC 20013, at $1.00 per single copy; 2-49 copies, 75¢ each; 50 copies or more, 50¢ each. Add $1.00 handling charge for orders under $20.

With a population expected to total 232 million as of July 1, 1982, the United States is the fourth most populous nation in the world (after China, India, and the Soviet Union). The current U.S. population growth rate of about 1.0 percent a year is one of the highest of all developed nations.

In 1981, the U.S. population added some 2.3 million people, which was the highest numerical increase of any developed country. Some 1.7 million of this growth was due to natural increase (the excess of births over deaths). The current fertility *rate* of U.S. women (1.9 births per woman) is almost the lowest in the nation's history; nonetheless, the annual *number* of births has risen from 3.1 million in the mid-1970s to 3.6 million in 1980 and 1981. This is because the number of women in the childbearing ages of 15-44 is at a record high, now that the women born during the 1947-1964 baby boom have arrived at those ages. The current death rate of 8.7 deaths per 1,000 population is also the lowest in U.S. history.

About one-third of U.S. population growth in 1980 and about 30 percent of the growth in 1981 was due to net legal immigration. With the continuing arrival of Southeast Asian refugees and sudden influx of 135,000 Cuban and Haitian refugees in 1980, legal immigration averaged over 750,000 in 1980 and 1981, compared to an average of 420,000 a year during the 1970s. Subtracting out emigration estimated at 100,000 a year, net legal immigration averaged about 600,000 a year in 1979-1981.

The estimated numerical growth of 2.3 million in 1981 does not take account of illegal immigration, which has increased tremendously in the past

Table 1. Population and Immigration Rate of the United States: 1700-1982

(Population in thousands; estimate as of July 1; includes armed forces overseas as from 1930)

Year	Population	Immigration rate per 1,000 population	Year	Population	Immigration rate per 1,000 population
1700	280	—	1890	63,056	7.2
1790	3,929	—	1900	76,094	5.9
1800	5,297	—	1910	92,407	11.3
1810	7,224	—	1920	106,461	4.0
1820	9,618	0.9	1930	123,188	2.0
1830	12,901	1.8	1940	132,122	0.5
1840	17,120	4.9	1950	151,684	1.6
1850	23,261	15.9	1960	180,671	1.5
1860	31,513	4.9	1970	204,879	1.8
1870	39,905	9.7	1980	227,158	3.6
1880	50,262	9.1	1981	229,304	3.0
			1982	232,000	

Sources: 1700: Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, *Atlas of World Population History* (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1978) p. 286; 1790-1970: Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, Part I (Washington, D.C.: 1975); 1980-81: Bureau of the Census, "Estimates of the Population of the United States, to October 1, 1981," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 906, 1981; 1982: Population Reference Bureau projection.

decade. Many observers currently estimate the net inflow of illegal immigrants at 500,000 a year, which when added to legal immigrants, suggests that immigration to the U.S. may now have climbed back to the record level of over a million a year observed in several years during the first two decades of this century. For the U.S., immigration currently plays a larger role in population growth than in almost any other country and will play an increasingly large role if the fertility rate remains low.

As this *Bulletin* also shows, the U.S. is now setting other demographic records. Both marriages and divorces are at an all-time high; household size is at an all-time low. For the first time in history, more than half the population now lives in the South and the West, and during the 1970s, for the first time in more than a century, nonmetropolitan areas grew faster than metropolitan areas. Educational attainment and the number of people in the labor force are at all-time highs; the drop in real family income between 1979 and 1980 was the largest recorded since World War II. And the current age distribution of the population is unique in U.S. history, with the bulge of the baby boom generation surrounded on both sides by much smaller "cohorts" (the older "depression" cohort born during the 1930s and the younger "baby bust" cohort born since the end of the 1960s)—a situation that has already posed problems for U.S. society and will for decades to come.

After describing "where we are" and the background of current U.S. population trends, the *Bulletin* takes a look at "where we're going," with the predictions of six demographic experts for trends in the remainder of the 1980s and a concluding section on the outlook for long-term U.S. population growth.

Population Growth to the Present

The United States is fortunate to have a record of its population growth from its beginning as an independent nation. Although at least 38 censuses were taken in the 13 colonies for the British Board of Trade, the continuous counting of the population began with the first decennial census in 1790, 14 years after independence was declared and two years after adoption of the Constitution. The Constitution had mandated that a census be taken at the beginning of each decade for the purpose of allocating "Representatives and Direct Taxes . . . among the several States."[1]

The first census was a far cry from today's sophisticated enumeration. The U.S. marshals charged with its taking had to design their own census forms and many were delivered with personal touches—tied with ribbon or wrapped in flowered wallpaper, for example. The count also took longer than the nine months allowed for it, but when the final tallies were submitted to Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, the U.S. population added up (more or less) to 4 million. Then, as now, the census aroused controversy. Jefferson felt that the enumeration was an undercount and James Madison's suggestion that the census collect more detailed information, such as age and occupation, was not taken for fear of invasion of privacy.

U.S. population growth since 1790 can be seen in Table 1. The count of nearly 4 million in 1790 had grown from about one-quarter million in 1700, indicating that growth averaged about 3 percent a year during the 18th century. This growth was primarily due to natural increase, rather than immigration.[2] In 1790, Virginia led the other 12 states in population, with 748,000 inhabitants, far ahead of second-place Pennsylvania with 434,000. Virginia's demographic prominence soon faded as rapid expansion to the west began. In 1800, Ohio had only 45,000 residents, but by 1840 its population of 1.5 million was 50 percent higher than that of Virginia. The busy port of New York enabled that state to take the population lead by 1810, a position it held until overtaken by California in the 1960s.[3]

There were only six cities of 8,000 or more inhabitants in 1790: Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston, Baltimore, and Salem, Massachusetts. Philadelphia, then the temporary capital, held first place with a population of 42,444. City growth could be rapid, however. Baltimore, for example, had only 200 people in 1752, but grew to 6,000 by 1775 as it captured the trade diverted from Philadelphia during the Revolutionary War.[4]

Immigration assumed a more important role in U.S. population growth during the 19th century. In 1820, the population was growing by about 280,000 a year, but only about 8,000 immigrants were recorded as entering at major ports. However, by 1851 when Irish immigration reached a peak of 221,253, immigration accounted for approximately half of annual population growth. The peak year in terms of *rates* was 1854 when the immigration rate was about 16 per 1,000 population, compared to a legal immigration rate of 3 per 1,000 in 1981. In terms of *numbers*, 1907 and 1914 were the zeniths of legal immigration, with 1.3 million and 1.2 million arrivals, respectively.[5]

In the 1980s, U.S. population growth has slowed by comparison with most of our earlier history as the birth rate has fallen following the baby boom of the 1950s and early 1960s. However, immigration has again become an important component of annual growth. Legal immigration is limited by law to about 400,000 to 500,000 a year, but our liberal policy toward refugees has raised the total considerably in recent years. In 1981, the U.S. population added 1.7 million people from natural increase (3,646,000 births minus 1,987,000 deaths)[6] and about 600,000

from legal immigration (697,000 legal immigrants, including refugees, minus approximately 100,000 emigrants). This total increase of 2.3 million people represents an annual growth rate of 1.0 percent—the highest growth rate since 1970 and one of the highest growth rates among the world's developed nations. Illegal immigration adds perhaps several hundred thousand more to the population each year, but the number is not known. The population at mid-year 1982 is estimated to be 232 million.

Racial and ethnic minorities

The U.S. is one of the world's most ethnically diverse nations, with the vast bulk of the population the descendants of willing or unwilling immigrants. The racial and ethnic makeup of the population is thus a vital aspect of our "demographics."

The first census in 1790 counted 757,000 blacks, 92 percent of them in slavery.[7] The black population was then 19.3 percent of the U.S. population, a proportion nearly twice that of today. The 1980 census counted 26.5 million blacks, comprising 11.7 percent of the total population (see Table 2). While most blacks still live in the South, migration to industrial centers of the North has reduced the South's share of the black population from over 90 percent in 1790 to a bare majority of 53 percent in 1980. The 1980 percentage is the same as that in 1970, which confirms that more blacks are now moving into the South than away from it.

The black fertility rate has always been higher than that of the white population, but with high death rates, the black population grew more slowly than the total population until about 1940. Since that time, the black growth rate has exceeded that of the general population, mainly because of the black population's continuing higher natural increase (births minus deaths). Unlike the U.S. population as a whole, the past growth of the black population is almost entirely due to natural increase. Varying estimates suggest that only 330,000 to 400,000 Africans entered the U.S. as slaves before the slave trade was abolished in 1808,[8] and immigration from Africa since then has never been large. This lack of black immigration, coupled with high levels of white immigration, partially explains the halving of the black proportion of the total U.S. population between 1790 and 1980.

Table 2. Racial and Ethnic Minorities: 1980

(Numbers in thousands)

Group	Number	Percent of total population
Blacks	26,488	11.7
Hispanics[a]	14,606	6.5
Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts	1,418	0.6
Asians and Pacific Islanders	3,501	1.5

Source: Bureau of the Census, "Age, Sex, Race, and Spanish Origin of the Population: 1980," *1980 Census of Population, Supplementary Reports*, PC-S1-1, May 1981.

[a] Hispanics (or "Spanish origin") may be of any race.

In contrast, the nation's other large minority, Hispanics, has grown consistently through both immigration and higher fertility. The 1980 census counted 14.6 million Hispanics, comprising 6.5 percent of the population (see Table 2). This was about 1 million more than expected, due in part to intensified efforts to enumerate minorities.

In 1950, Hispanics in the U.S. consisted primarily of several million Mexican-Americans residing in the southwest, many in areas which were originally part of Mexico. The postwar migration of Puerto Ricans had only begun and the Cuban population was limited to a few small groups in Florida and New York.

With high immigration since then, the Hispanic population is now by far the fastest-growing ethnic group in the country. The Puerto Rican population has grown to about 2 million, primarily

in the New York City area, while immigration from Cuba since the 1959 Cuban Revolution has increased their numbers to nearly 1 million, chiefly in Florida and to a lesser extent in New York. The Mexican population, still concentrated mainly in the southwest, now stands at about 9 million. It is important to bear in mind that the "Hispanic" population actually consists of groups with a number of different national origins, living in different parts of the country.

Native Americans—Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts—numbered about 1.4 million and were 0.6 percent of the population in 1980 (Table 2). Eskimos and Aleuts are predominantly located in their native areas of Alaska and the northwest. American Indians are heavily concentrated in the southwest, although one-fourth of them live in the North Central and Northeast regions.

Asians and Pacific Islanders, numbering 3.5 million in 1980, comprise another significant minority. This group is composed primarily of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos, along with a growing number of Southeast Asian refugees, all of whom contribute to the diversified fabric of the U.S. population.

Fertility

Of the three components of population growth—births, deaths, and net international migration—changes in numbers and rates of births have been most important in determining changes in U.S. population growth since the nation's beginning.

Until the early decades of the 19th century, American women averaged eight to ten children and the crude birth rate was about 55 births per 1,000 population. Fertility has declined gradually since then, interrupted only by the prolonged baby boom after World War II. By 1900 the birth rate was down to 28.8 and the total fertility rate (TFR) was 3.6 births per woman. (The TFR indicates the average number of children a woman would have if she bore children throughout her childbearing years—ages 15 to 44—at the same rate as women of those ages actually did in a given year.) In 1936, during the Great Depression, the TFR fell to a low of 2.1 and the birth rate was 18.4

Both numbers and rates of births began climbing during the early 1940s and, as expected, spurted upward immediately after World War II ended in 1945; in 1947 the TFR was 3.2. Completely unexpected was the continuing rise in the decade that followed. In 1957 the TFR reached 3.7, the birth rate was 25.3 (the highest since 1924), and over 4.3 million births were recorded, compared to an annual average of 2.7 million in the 37 years from 1909 to 1945. As seen in Figure 2 (page 8), the TFR fell sharply after 1961 to a low of just under 1.8 in 1976, and in 1981 had climbed only to 1.9—still well below the average 2.1 births per woman needed to replace the population in the long run. Similarly, the birth rate fell to 14.7 in 1975 and 1976—the lowest in U.S. history—and had climbed only to 15.7 by 1981. Annual births fell to just over 3.1 million in the mid-1970s and rose only to 3.6 million in 1980 and 1981, despite an increase in women of childbearing age to nearly 52 million—up from 36 million in 1960.

The baby boom, dating from 1947 to about 1964, can be explained demographically by several factors: an increase in the proportion of women in the childbearing ages as a result of the higher fertility of the 1920s compared to the 1930s; decreases in the proportion of women remaining single, in childlessness, and in the average age at marriage; and much shorter intervals between marriage and the first and succeeding births; plus some makeup births among older women who had postponed childbearing during the depression and wartime years. Economically, the prosperous postwar situation, with abundant jobs for the relatively scarce young men born during the

Figure 2. Total Fertility Rate: 1917-1981



Sources: Leon F. Bouvier, "America's Baby Boom Generation: The Fateful Bulge," *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1980) Figure 1; Bureau of the Census, "Population Profile of the United States: 1980," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 363, 1981, Table 8; and Bureau of the Census, Population Division, personal communication, for 1981.

1930s, encouraged couples to marry and begin childbearing early and also to have an extra third or fourth child as they moved to the expanding suburbs, with more room to raise children. Sociologists add another explanation: the resurfacing of pro-marriage, pro-housewife, and pro-natalist forces "that have always been woven into American culture," or "the feminine mystique," as Betty Friedan called it.[9]

Demographers have also been surprised by the delay and faintness of the fertility "echo" that was expected in the 1970s as the baby boom women entered their childbearing ages. Perhaps because of unsettled economic conditions since the early 1970s, compounded by competition for jobs among the swollen baby boom generation, U.S. women have been delaying marriage and childbearing. University of Pennsylvania demographer-economist Richard Easterlin predicts that the TFR will again rise above replacement level in the 1990s as the small "baby bust" cohort of the 1970s enters adulthood and —like the small cohort of the 1930s who produced the baby boom—finds more jobs and housing available to them.[10] Although birth rates have generally turned up slightly since 1976, especially for women aged 30-34, as seen in Figure 3, most other demographers feel fertility is likely to stay low (see predictions for the 1980s page 40). They point to the increasing proportion of women with college degrees and in the labor force, and the availability of more effective contraception and legal abortion—all factors that tend to reduce fertility.

Figure 3. Birth Rates by Age of Mother: 1950-1979



Source: National Center for Health Statistics, "Advance Report of Final Natality Statistics, 1979," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 30, No. 6, Supplement (September 1981) Figure 2.

Fertility differentials

Although all groups of American women participated in the baby boom of 1947-64 and the sharp fertility decline that followed, differences in fertility levels persist.

The TFR of nonwhite women (about 90 percent of whom are black) has been 30 to more than 40 percent higher than that of white women since at least 1917. In 1979, the nonwhite rate of 2.4 births per woman was one-third higher

than the white rate of 1.8. Fertility is still higher for Hispanic women: in 1980, the number of births per 1,000 women aged 18-44 was 68.5 for white women, 84.0 for black women, and 106.0 for Hispanic women.[11]

Part of this difference is due to black and Hispanic women's lower educational levels and incomes, which tend to go along with higher fertility. In 1980, births per 1,000 women were highest among women who failed to finish high school (91.9) and lowest among women with five or more years of college (52.1); and were 94.3 births per 1,000 women in families earning $5,000 or less compared to 48.5 in families with incomes of $25,000 and over.

Regionally, birth rates are highest in the West and South; the West includes Utah and Idaho with many Mormons who also tend to have high fertility, and both regions have large proportions of Hispanics and newly arrived young in-migrants. Births per 1,000 women in 1980 were 80.2 in the West and 71.7 in the South compared to the national average of 71.1, and only 62.4 in the Northeast (see page 2 for a map of these regions). Rural women continue to have slightly more children than urban women; in 1979, women aged 30-34 in nonmetropolitan areas had an average of 2.2 children compared to 1.8 among their counterparts in metropolitan areas. Women in the labor force consistently have fewer children than women who are not employed or looking for work; among ever-married women aged 35-44 in 1978, for example, those currently in the labor force had 2.7 children, on average, compared with 3.2 among women not in the labor force.[12]

One longstanding fertility differential has now almost disappeared in the U.S. —that between Catholic and non-Catholic women. The differential began to narrow in the 1920s and 1930s but widened again during the baby boom as Catholic fertility rose higher than that of non-Catholics. By 1975, however, fertility rates were virtually identical for both groups, as Catholic women's fertility rate had fallen faster than that of non-Catholics and almost as large a proportion of Catholic as non-Catholic married couples were practicing contraception (76 versus 80 percent), with an equal proportion in both groups (34 percent) using the pill.[13]

Teenage and out-of-wedlock childbearing

Although teenage pregnancy and childbearing remain of great concern in the U.S., the birth *rates* of teenagers have declined along with the rates of older women since the baby boom peak year of 1957, as seen in Figure 3 (page 9). The 1979 rate of 53 births per 1,000 women aged 15-19 was just over half the 1957 rate of 97. However, because of increased numbers of teenaged women, the decline in *numbers* of births to teenagers has been much less: from 609,000 in 1960 to just over 560,000 in 1979.[14] In 1979, births to women under 20 accounted for 16 percent of all U.S. births, down from more than 19 percent in 1974. Since children born in the baby boom peak year of 1957 reached age 20 in 1977, the number of teenaged women is now declining. Coupled with teenagers' falling birth rate, this should mean continuing declines in the number and proportion of births to teenagers.

On the other hand, the incidence of pregnancies, sexual activity, and *out-of-wedlock* births among teenagers is rising. From 1973 to 1978, teenage pregnancies increased 13 percent to reach 1.1 million: 38 percent (434,000) of these 1978 pregnancies ended in abortions; 22 percent ended as out-of-wedlock births; only 17 percent resulted in births that were conceived after marriage; 10 percent ended in births conceived premaritally but legitimated by marriage; and the remainder ended in miscarriage.[15]

The proportion of sexually active unmarried women aged 15-19 rose by two-thirds in the 1970s, reaching 50

percent among those living in metropolitan areas in 1979; almost all of the rise was accounted for by increased premarital sexual activity among white teenagers.[13]

Out-of-wedlock births among teenagers rose from 15 percent of all teenage births in 1960 to 46 percent in 1979. However, teenagers' share of total out-of-wedlock births in the U.S. has fallen since 1974. This is because rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing have risen among women aged 20 and over since 1974. Women in their twenties have been delaying marriage and, as with teenagers, premarital sexual activity among women over 20 has increased. The proportion of out-of-wedlock births to unmarried women of all ages was 17 percent of total births in 1979, up from 11 percent in 1970.

Contraception and abortion

In 1976, according to the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), 68 percent of currently married U.S. women aged 15-44 were using contraception.[17] Use of sterilization rose dramatically in the early 1970s among white couples, though not among blacks; by 1976 nearly half (48 percent) of white married women aged 35-44 reported that they or their husbands had been sterilized.

The pill was still by far the most popular contraceptive method among nonsterilized couples in 1976, but the NSFG survey revealed that the dramatic rise in use of the pill since its introduction in the U.S. in 1960 had come to a halt. Based on pill sales and family planning clinic data, Alan Guttmacher Institute researchers declared in early 1982 that "the proportion of American women aged 15-44 using the pill is estimated to have fallen by as much as one-fourth between 1975 and 1978, and has probably declined further since."[18] From their 1976 and 1979 surveys of women aged 15-19, Johns Hopkins University demographers Melvin Zelnik and John Kantner also found that, although

Carl Haub

The baby boom generation, born 1947-64, are having smaller families than their parents did.

contraceptive use had increased among teenagers, use of the pill, together with the IUD, "declined by 41 percent over the three-year period, while use of withdrawal and rhythm rose by 86 percent."[19]

Both teams of researchers credit the widespread shift away from use of the most effective contraceptive methods with the increased rate of unintended pregnancy that has been "the most important factor" since at least 1975 in increasing numbers of abortions. Following the Supreme Court's legalization of abortion throughout the U.S. in 1973, legal abortions more than doubled from 744,600 in 1973 to 1.55 million in 1980, although the rate of increase has slowed.[20] About a third of abortions were obtained by teenagers in this period and three-quarters by unmarried women.

Marriage, Divorce, Households

The fertility decline of the 1970s partly reflects the decline in marriage rates and rise in divorce rates during the 1970s, and is reflected in the drop in the average number of persons per household.

Figure 4. Women's Rates of First Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage: 1963-1979



Sources: National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), "Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1979," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Supplement (May 1981) Table 2, and NCHS unpublished data.

Marriage and divorce

In 1981, there were 2.4 million marriages in the U.S., 13 percent more than in 1970, and the highest annual total in the nation's history. The marriage rate was 10.6 per 1,000 population, almost a record, and one of the highest marriage rates in the world.[21]

One reason the general U.S. marriage rate is so high is that the U.S. divorce rate is also high and that most divorced persons remarry. Five out of every six divorced men and three out of every four divorced women remarry, according to estimates for 1980.[22] In 1979, for example, 44 percent of all marriages were remarriages for one or both of the partners, up from 30 percent in 1969.[23] Annual divorces climbed above one million in 1975 and reached 1.2 million in 1981. The divorce rate per 1,000 population doubled from 2.2 to 5.4 between 1962 and 1979, but now appears to have stabilized.

Although the 1970s saw a continuing rise in the *number* of marriages and divorces and in the *rates per 1,000 total population*, more refined rates which use as a base the number of persons most eligible to marry or divorce showed a decline in marriage, but a steady increase in divorce. As seen in the upper panel of Figure 4, the first marriage rate per 1,000 never-married women aged 14 and over peaked at 88 in the late 1960s and dropped to 62 in 1979. The remarriage rate per 1,000 previously divorced women aged 14 and over peaked at 135 in 1969 and dropped almost steadily to 104 in 1979. Meanwhile the divorce rate per 1,000 married women aged 15 and over continued to climb: from 10 in 1963 to more than double that rate—23—in 1979 (bottom panel, Figure 4).

With the competition for jobs compounded by economic recession, the swollen baby boom generation has been delaying marriage and older divorced persons have been delaying remarriage. For young women and men, singlehood has also become more attractive. Postponement of marriage has been especially great among women in their early twenties. The proportion of women still single at ages 20-24 has gone up by nearly 80 percent since 1960, from 28 percent to over 50 percent in 1980, and women's median age at first marriage rose from 20.3 to 22.1. For men

in these two decades, the proportion still single at ages 20-24 rose from 55 percent to 69 percent and the median age at first marriage increased from 22.8 to 24.6.

Although the divorce rate per 1,000 total population appears to have stabilized in the last few years, estimates based on data for 1976-77 suggest that half of all recent marriages will end in divorce—19 percent before the fifth anniversary and 33 percent before the tenth.[24] However, the trend toward later marriage could reduce divorce rates because women who marry in their twenties are much less likely to divorce than those who marry in their teens.

Households and living arrangements

The number of U.S. households grew from 63.4 million to 82.4 million between 1970 and 1981—a gain of 30 percent (Figure 5)—while the total population grew by only 13 percent in these 11 years.

This vast increase in households is partly explained by the baby boom generation's entry into their twenties, the ages when most new households are formed, but there are other demographic factors involved. Young people are delaying marriage, and yet they leave their parental homes earlier than past generations to set up independent housekeeping. Though recent press stories suggest that some young single people and even married couples are being driven back to the parental nest by hard times, most are unlikely to return. The increase in divorces is also a factor; each divorce usually adds another household. Also, people are living longer and more of the elderly are maintaining their own homes.[25]

The average size of households dropped notably in the 1970s: from 3.14 persons in 1970 to 2.73 in 1981. This reflects declining fertility and also the increase in one-parent families and nonfamily households which tend to be small. Nonfamily households increased

Figure 5. Number of Households by Type: 1970 and 1981



Sources: Adapted with permission from Arthur J. Norton and Paul C. Glick, "What's Happening to Households?" *American Demographics*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (March 1979) p. 20; updated to 1981 from Bureau of the Census, "Households and Families by Type: March 1981, Advance Data," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 367, 1981, Table 1.

much faster than family households from 1970 to 1981—84 percent compared to 17 percent—as seen in Figure 5.*

The profile of households in 1981 was very different from that of only 11 years earlier in 1970, as Figure 5 shows. In 1970, 81 percent of all households were family types—70 percent maintained by married couples and 11 percent maintained by a man or woman with no spouse present. In 1981, only 60 percent of households included married couples and 13 percent were families headed by a man or woman alone. Family households headed by a woman with no husband present increased 65 percent between 1970 and 1981.

The proportion of households consisting of people living alone has also increased notably to 23 percent in 1981—triple the 8 percent of 1940. During the 1970s, most of this increase was among never-married or divorced people and people under age 35, but 65 percent of people living alone in 1980 were over 45, and widowed women over 65 are the most likely of any group to be living alone.

The numbers of unmarried couples living together more than tripled between 1970 and 1981—from 523,000 in 1970 to 1.8 million in 1981.[26] Unmarried couples comprised 3.5 percent of all couple-households in 1981; about two-thirds were maintained by persons under 35, and in about 20 percent of these households, both partners were under 25.

The increase in divorce (and separation) has taken a toll on children. An estimated 1.2 million children under age 18 were involved in divorces in 1979, more than twice the figure (562,000) of 1963.[27] The great majority of all children under 18 still live with two parents (not necessarily both their natural parents) but the proportion has gone down from 88 percent in 1960 to 77 percent in 1980, while the proportion of children living with one parent more than doubled—from 9 percent to 20 percent (see Table 3). Black children are particularly disadvantaged: in 1980, more black children under 18 were living with their mother only (44 percent) than

*A *family household* consists of a married couple, with or without children, or a man or woman with children, or any other combination of relatives living together. A *nonfamily household* consists of an individual living alone or sharing living quarters with one or more unrelated persons.

Table 3. Living Arrangements of Children Under 18: 1960, 1970, 1980

Living arrangements	Year			White, 1980	Black, 1980
	1960	1970	1980		
All children under 18 (millions)	64.3	69.5	61.7	51.0	9.3
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Living with two parents	87.5	83.1	76.3	82.7	42.2
Living with one parent	9.1	13.4	19.7	15.1	45.8
Mother only	7.9	11.5	18.0	13.5	43.8
Father only	1.1	1.9	1.7	1.6	2.0
Other[a]	3.4	3.5	3.7	2.2	12.0

Sources: Paul C. Glick and Arthur J. Norton, "Marrying, Divorcing, and Living Together in the U.S. Today," *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 32, No. 5 (February 1979 updated reprint) Table 14; and Bureau of the Census, "Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1980," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 365, 1981, Tables A and 5.

[a]Living with other relatives or nonrelatives only, or in institutions.

with two parents (42 percent). Among white children, 83 percent were living with two parents and only 15 percent with one parent. Census Bureau demographers Arthur Norton and Paul Glick have estimated that if current trends continue, 45 percent of children born in recent years are likely to live for at least some months in a one-parent family before they reach age 18.[28]

Mortality

Except for 1918 during the nationwide influenza epidemic, the mortality rate in the U.S. declined steadily from the mid-19th century through the early 1950s. In 1900, the overall death rate was 17.2 deaths per 1,000 population; in 1954 the rate was down to 9.2 per 1,000. From 1954 to 1968, the rate remained so static that further decline was not expected.[29] However, the decline resumed again in 1968 and has continued to the present. The 1981 rate was 8.7 deaths per 1,000 population.

Life expectancy

One of the best measures of a nation's health is life expectancy. At the turn of the century, the average newborn American could be expected to live only 47.3 years. By 1980, as a result of improvements in both living standards and medical care, life expectancy for an American at birth had increased to 73.6 years. Although among the world's highest, U.S. life expectancy is exceeded by that of Hong Kong, Japan, and Iceland (each 76 years), and the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (each 75 years).[30]

The increase in life expectancy has not been constant. The figure of 73.6 in 1980 was 0.2 years short of life expectancy in 1979—the first such decrease since 1967-68, when a decrease of 0.3 years occurred. Both declines reflected increases in the death rate associated with influenza epidemics—those of 1968 and 1980.[31]

The improvement in life expectancy has not been uniform for all age groups or for both sexes and whites and nonwhites. The greatest increase occurred in the younger ages. The expectation of life for an infant in the U.S. increased by 26 years between 1900 and 1978. At the other end of the age spectrum, life expectancy for 60-year-olds improved by only 3.2 years; a 60-year-old in 1900 could expect to live another 14.5 years, while a 60-year-old in 1978 could expect to survive 19.7 more years, on average. These data reflect the control of infectious and other diseases that especially affected young people in the early part of this century. We have not yet brought under control the degenerative diseases (heart disease, cancer, and stroke) that plague the elderly.

U.S. females, particularly white females, have had a longer life expectancy than males since at least the late 19th century (see Figure 6). As mortality levels have declined, the gap be-

Figure 6. Life Expectancy at Birth, by Race and Sex: 1900-1980



Sources: Abdel R. Omran, "Epidemiologic Transition in the U.S.: The Health Factor in Population Change," *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (May 1980 updated reprint) Table 3; and National Center for Health Statistics, "Annual Summary of Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Divorces: United States, 1980," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 29, No. 13 (September 1981) p. 3.

tween male and female life expectancy has grown rather than decreased. In 1900, a white female's life expectancy was 2.1 years greater than a white male's, and a nonwhite female's exceeded that of a nonwhite male by 1.0 years. In 1940, the gap between the sexes had increased to 4.5 years for whites and 3.4 years for nonwhites. By 1980, there was a 7.6-year difference between white females and males, with life expectancies of 78.1 and 70.5 years, respectively, and an 8.7-year difference between nonwhite females and males, with life expectancies of 74.0 and 65.3 years. The life expectancy of nonwhite females reached that of white males in 1965 and has continued to improve to the point where nonwhite females' expectation of life is now 3.5 years greater than that of white males.

Causes of death

The major causes of death for Americans have changed significantly since the turn of the century. In 1900, infectious diseases—particularly pneumonia, influenza and tuberculosis—were the leading causes of death, accounting for over one-fifth of all deaths (see Table 4). Heart disease ranked fourth and cancer ranked ninth. By 1940, pneumonia and influenza had dropped to fifth place; tuberculosis to seventh. Heart disease, cancer and stroke had moved into the top three spots, where they have remained. These three diseases now account for nearly four-fifths of annual deaths in the U.S.

The decrease in deaths due to infectious diseases was due initially (between 1860 and 1900) to an improved standard of living, including better nutrition, sanitation, and housing.[32] Beginning in 1900, improvements in medical care, such as immunization and, later, the use of antibiotics, further prevented deaths from infectious diseases. As a result, people who contracted those diseases survived them and lived to older ages where degenerative dis-

Table 4. Ten Leading Causes of Death: 1900, 1940, 1980

Rank		Percent of total deaths
	1900	
1.	Pneumonia and influenza	11.8
2.	Tuberculosis	11.3
3.	Diarrhea and enteritis	8.3
4.	Heart disease	8.0
5.	Stroke	6.2
6.	Nephritis	5.2
7.	All accidents	4.5
8.	Diseases of early infancy	4.2
9.	Cancer	3.7
10.	Senility	2.9
	1940	
1.	Heart disease	25.2
2.	Cancer	11.2
3.	Stroke	8.4
4.	Nephritis	7.5
5.	Pneumonia and influenza	6.5
6.	Accidents (except motor vehicle)	4.4
7.	Tuberculosis	4.3
8.	Diabetes	2.5
9.	Motor vehicle accidents	2.4
10.	Premature birth	2.3
	1980	
1.	Heart disease	49.6
2.	Cancer	20.9
3.	Stroke	8.6
4.	Accidents	5.3
5.	Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease	2.8
6.	Pneumonia and influenza	2.6
7.	Diabetes	1.7
8.	Chronic liver disease and cirrhosis	1.6
9.	Atherosclerosis	1.5
10.	Suicide	1.3

Sources: Forrest E. Linder and Robert D. Grove, *Vital Statistics Rates in the United States 1900-1940* (National Office of Vital Statistics, 1947, reprint edition by Arno Press, 1976) Table 15; National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), *Vital Statistics of the United States 1940*, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: 1943) Table 14; NCHS, "Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths for 1981," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1982) Table 6.

eases predominate.

The decline in mortality rates since 1968 is due primarily to a steady decline in the death rate for ischemic, or coronary, heart disease.[33] Despite the fact that heart disease has remained the leading cause of death for the past 40 years, the death rate for it peaked in the mid-1960s and has declined by 25 percent since then.[34] The reasons for this cannot be definitively determined. Changes in life style, including a reduction in cigarette smoking and in consumption of animal fats, and an increase in physical activity, have been cited. However, these changes have not occurred among all adults, while the decline in mortality from heart disease has. Also cited as contributing to the decline are medical advances, including improved emergency services, increased use of coronary care units, improved diagnostic techniques, increased dissemination of information and screening programs, and availability of low-cost medical care to the poor and aged.[35]

Cancer is the second leading cause of death in the U.S. There has been an overall rise in mortality due to cancer, although significant gains have been made in the treatment of certain types of cancer. With substantial improvements in the treatment of leukemia and Hodgkins disease, cancer mortality for children under 15 dropped more than 30 percent between 1968 and 1978.[36] In the same ten years, cancer mortality for the population aged 15-44 declined about 20 percent because of the reduced incidence of breast cancer in younger women and lung cancer in younger men. There has been a steady increase in the cancer death rate for the population aged 45 and over, due primarily to increases in lung cancer. Lung cancer mortality increased by 37 percent between 1968 and 1980, while all other cancer death rates actually declined by 4 percent. Further decline in lung cancer mortality is certainly possible. It has been determined that more than 80 percent of all lung cancer could be prevented if people stopped smoking.[37]

Stroke is the third leading cause of death in the U.S. The death rate for stroke dropped 41 percent between 1968 and 1980. This reduction occurred in all age groups and among both whites and nonwhites. The reduction in stroke mortality may be related to a lowered incidence of the disease, better treatment of hypertension, and improved techniques for managing and rehabilitating stroke victims.[38]

Accidents are the fourth most common cause of death, but they are the leading cause of death for the population aged 1-34. Fifty percent of all accidents are related to motor vehicles. The death rate from motor-vehicle accidents declined very slowly until 1973 when it dropped 17 percent in one year, following introduction of the 55 mph speed limit. However, the rate began to mount again after 1976, presumably due to relaxed attitudes toward the lowered speed limit.[39]

Infant mortality

An infant's chance of surviving birth and its first year of life has improved tremendously in the U.S. since the turn of the century (see Figure 7, page 18). In 1900, approximately 100 infants died for every 1,000 live births. By 1950, there were only 29 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. From 1950 to 1965, the infant mortality rate remained fairly stable, but the decline then resumed and by 1981, the rate had dropped to 11.7 deaths per 1,000 live births—the lowest infant mortality rate in U.S. history.

Despite the phenomenal decline in overall infant morality, there remains a large gap between the rates for white and nonwhite infants. In 1978, for example, a nonwhite infant was almost twice as likely to die as a white infant. One reason for this difference is the incidence of low birth weight among black infants, who comprise about 90 percent of all nonwhite infants. Low

Figure 7: Infant Mortality Rate: 1915-1981



Sources: Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: 1975) Table B; National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), "Annual Summary of Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Divorces: United States, 1980," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 29, No. 13 (September 1981) Table G; NCHS, "Births, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths for 1981," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 1982) p. 1.

birth weight (less than 2,500 grams or 5½ pounds) is one of the most significant predictors of the survival of an infant. For a low-birth-weight infant, the chance of dying during the first month of life is 40 times greater than for an infant of normal weight, and is five times greater during the subsequent 11 months. The percent of black infants born at low weights is twice as high as that of white infants. This accounts for most of the difference in neonatal mortality (deaths during the first 28 days of life) between black and white infants.[40]

The gap between black and white infant mortality is one reason why even the low U.S. overall infant mortality rate of 11.7 in 1981 still ranks at least 13th among the world's nations. According to the latest available data (for 1979 or 1980), Iceland has the lowest infant mortality rate, with only 5.4 deaths under age one per 1,000 live births, followed by Sweden (6.7), Japan (7.4), Finland (7.7), Switzerland (8.5), and several other European countries, plus Canada in ninth place at 10.9.[41]

Immigration

The United States was founded in the 18th century by immigrants and the children of immigrants. In its relatively brief history, the U.S. has continued receiving immigrants, admitting a greater number than any other country in the world.

Immigration contributed significantly to the needs of the new and expanding nation and at the same time offered opportunities to people from other lands suffering political, economic, or religious oppression. Immigrants have helped to build railroads, industries and cities and have left an indelible mark on the arts, sciences and political life of the U.S. The numbers of immigrants and the proportion of population growth they represent in comparison to natural increase have varied over the years as have the ethnic origins of immigrants.

The U.S. government defines as an alien anyone living in this country who is not a citizen and identifies four categories: (1) immigrants: persons admitted to the U.S. to reside here permanently; (2) nonimmigrants: persons admitted for specific temporary time periods such as foreign students or tourists; (3) refugees: persons fleeing their homeland who are conditionally allowed to remain in the U.S. for indefinite periods, and who, if they qualify, may become permanent residents; and (4) illegal immigrants: "undocumented migrants" who are in the U.S. illegally through entry without inspection, abuse of visa (e.g. overstaying), or use of fraudulent documents.

Statistics on immigration to the U.S.

were not gathered until 1820 when 8,385 entrants were recorded. Methods of counting those entering and leaving left much to be desired, and while improved, even today the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) figures are imprecise. One problem is that while legal immigrants are counted, no one knows how many people annually emigrate (i.e. leave with intention to settle elsewhere). Until recently, the Census Bureau estimated that 40,000 people leave annually; the current generally accepted estimate is 100,000.[42]

Another major record-keeping problem is the extent of illegal immigration. The numbers are simply unknown: estimates for recent years range from 100,000 to 500,000 and more. Similarly, the aggregate number of people cur-

Figure 8. Levels and Rates of Legal Immigration: 1880-1979



Source: Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, *U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, Final Report* (Washington, D.C., 1981).

[a]Decennial net migration as a percentage of population growth equals total decennial population increase minus natural population increase (births minus deaths) divided by total population increase.

[b]Emigration exceeded immigration by 85,000.

rently residing illegall in the U.S. is unknown: estimates range from three to six million.[43] Some are even higher. The 1980 census count of the total population was 5.5 million higher than expected; much of this may have been due to increased illegal immigration during the 1970s, as well as improved enumeration of illegal immigrants.

From 1820 to 1900, over 19 million *legal* immigrants were counted. By the end of 1980, the total number of immigrants recorded during 160 years of record-keeping had risen to over 50 million.

These aggregate numbers hide the ebb and flow of immigration levels from year-to-year and decade-to-decade as well as the proportion of population growth that is due to net legal immigration (immigrants minus emigrants) as opposed to natural increase (births minus deaths).

The top of Figure 8 (page 19) shows the average annual legal immigration by decade from the 1880s through the 1970s. The last two decades of the 19th century and the first two of the 20th saw enormous waves of European immigrants arriving in search of a better life. Legal immigration reached its highest volume between 1880 and 1920; over one million immigrants entered in each of six years: 1905, 1906, 1907, 1910, 1913 and 1914. By comparison, legal immigration in the 1970s averaged about 420,000 a year. In 1980, the figure jumped to over 800,000 with the arrival of extra-large numbers of Southeast Asian, Cuban and Haitian refugees. In 1981, there were close to 700,000 immigrants. The lowest number of legal immigrants was recorded during the 1930s, the decade of the Great Depression.

The middle panel of Figure 8 shows that in the last 100 years, the annual number of immigrants has been small in comparison to the population already here. For only one decade—1900-1909—did the annual number of immigrants exceed 1 percent of the resident population.

Net migration (immigration minus emigration) as a percentage of population *growth* is another matter. The bottom panel of Figure 8 shows that net legal migration has during certain decades accounted for a significant proportion of growth: about 40 percent in 1880-1889 and 1900-1909, and over 20 percent in the 1970s. In 1980, because of high refugee admission, legal immigration accounted for one-third of U.S. population growth, and in 1981, 30 percent.

It must be remembered that the percentage of growth due to net migration rises and falls in relation to the amount of growth due to natural increase. Thus in times of low fertility, even a modest amount of net migration contributes

Figure 9. Legal Immigrants Admitted to the U.S., by Region of



Source: Leon F. Bouvier, *Immigration and Its Impact on U.S. Society*, Population Trends and Public Policy Series No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1981) Figure 1.

more to population growth than a relatively large amount during times of high fertility. Figure 8 (bottom panel) illustrates this phenomenon for the 1940s and 1950s. Although immigrants in the 1950s numbered more than twice as many as in the 1940s, the proportion of population growth they represented was the same—about 10 percent—in both decades. This is because of the much higher fertility in the 1950s, the peak of the post-World War II baby boom. If our current below-replacement fertility continues, immigration will account for all U.S. population growth by 2020-2030.[44]

Ethnic origins

Throughout the 19th century, the vast majority of immigrants came from Northern and Western Europe—95 percent between 1820 and 1860 and 68 percent in 1861-1900 (see Figure 9). For almost 100 years after American independence, there were virtually no laws governing the admission of aliens; since that time, immigration laws have increasingly determined which countries can send migrants to the U.S.

The peak immigration years of 1880 through 1920—consisting predominantly of Southern and Eastern Europeans—led to the enactment of laws prescribing the physical and mental health, financial status, and morals of aliens. These first discriminatory laws also included restrictions based on race and political persuasion.

The Immigration Act of 1929 established annual quotas totaling about 154,000 people. It also continued the 1924 legislation restricting or prohibiting immigration from certain countries in an effort to retain the racial and ethnic composition of the nation's population as of 1890. This had the effect of favoring Northern and Western Europeans over immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and other regions of the world. Note the shifts in the relative percentage of these groups between 1901-1930 and 1931-1960 (Figure 9).

The 1965 amendment to the Immigration Act of 1952 shifted from restrictions based on national origins to priorities based on family reunification and needed skills and professions. As of 1981, 270,000 people a year are allowed to enter the U.S. as legal immigrants, with no more than 20,000 from any one country. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted in addition to the 270,000 limit; the number in this "unlimited" category averaged about 136,000 a year until recently, rose to 149,000 in 1979, and may go much higher in coming years (see page 43).

The system established by the 1965 amendment has meant a dramatic change in immigrants by geographic origin. Eighty percent of immigrants admitted from 1820 to 1964 were Euro-

Birth: 1861-1979 (Numbers in percentages of total)



Figure 10. Number of Legal Immigrants and Refugees: 1976-1981



Source: Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, *U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: 1981).

*Includes some of the 145,000 extra-numerically limited visas issues as a result of the Silva v. Levi court decision, implemented 1977-1981.

pean. In the late 1970s, Europeans were only 13 percent of the total, while Latin Americans made up 42 percent and Asians 39 percent of all immigrants (see Figure 9).

Refugees

Another category of legal aliens are refugees, those forced to leave their homelands. Refugees were previously admitted under the Attorney General's parole authority. Replacing the Attorney General's parole, the Refugee Act of 1980 set the limit at 50,000 refugees a year through 1982, but allowed the quota to be raised by the President after consultation with Congress. After 1982, the limit will be determined solely by consultation between the President and Congress. In recent years, the numbers of refugees admitted have been very high, due to the exodus of people fleeing Southeast Asia beginning in the mid-1970s, and more recently from the Caribbean, notably Cuba and Haiti. In 1980, for example, there were close to 370,000 refugees; 135,000 of them were Cubans or Haitians admitted as special entrants (see Figure 10). Over 200,000 refugees were estimated to have entered the U.S. in 1981. Under current policy, refugees may apply for permanent residence status after one year and can opt for citizenship after four more years. As citizens, their immediate relatives will receive preference for immigration to the U.S. under the "unlimited" category. Including the

special influx of 1980, the annual numbers of refugees averaged about 200,000 for 1979-1981 (Figure 10).

Illegal immigration

Although estimates of illegal immigration vary, many observers believe that the net inflow is now roughly 500,000 a year, which when added to 400,000 net legal immigration and 200,000 average refugee levels, pushes annual net immigration over the record high million level of the 1900s and the 1910s. A majority of the illegal entrants are thought to come from Mexico, an estimate based on apprehensions of illegals by the INS. In 1977, there were over one million apprehensions; in 1980, there were 900,000. About 90 percent of those apprehended were from Mexico.[45] However, the number of apprehensions is not equal to the number of persons entering illegally, since the same person may be apprehended several times. There is also a return flow as some migrants enter to work for a period of time and then return home. Others stay.

Where immigrants live

Legal immigrants are not distributed evenly throughout the U.S. Of the 4.5 million permanent resident aliens reporting their addresses to the INS in 1980 in accordance with requirements, over 70 percent resided in six states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois and New Jersey.

Public concerns

There has been particular concern about high levels of immigration—legal and illegal—in the states and communities receiving the largest numbers, including refugees. However, recent national opinion polls show widespread discontent with current immigration policy and enforcement procedures, with a majority in favor of reducing immigration of all kinds.

Such restrictionist sentiments seem strongest during economic hard times

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

Indochinese refugee girls resettled in New York City. Recent high levels of immigration have aroused restrictionist sentiments in the U.S.

when inflation and unemployment are high and when perceived costs to taxpayers for social services to immigrants —such as schools and hospitals—seem most burdensome. Racial and cultural aspects of immigration, such as bilingualism in areas of the country with large Hispanic populations, represent to some an unwelcome change from earlier days when immigrants from many lands quickly learned English and desired to assimilate into the main culture. Still others question whether new groups should assimilate or should retain their own cultures and languages.

Immigration policy is currently under debate and will no doubt undergo several revisions in the decades to come. In March of 1982, an immigration reform bill was introduced to the U.S. Congress by Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.) and Representative Romano L. Mazzoli (D-Ky.). Among its major points (as of June 1982) are:

• A numerical ceiling of 425,000 legal admissions per year, not including refugees. 100,000 of these immigrant visas will be allocated to "independent" immigrants (workers, investors and "special" immigrants). Of the 325,000 remaining, first access is to immediate family members (not including siblings) of U.S. citizens; then all others.

• Refugees will continue to be admitted as a result of consultation between the Administration and Congress.

• Immigrant visas will remain limited to 20,000 per year for any one country, except for Mexico and Canada, which will receive up to 40,000, and can use each other's unused visas.

• Illegal immigrants who arrived in the U.S. before January 1, 1978, will be allowed to apply for permanent resident status; those arriving in 1978 and 1979 may apply for temporary legal status. Later arrivals will be deported.

• After a one-year moratorium, employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants will be fined $1,000 for the first offense, $2,000 for the second offense. Recruiters of illegal aliens will be subject to criminal prosecution.

• Prospective employees will be required to provide documentation of their citizenship or legal immigrant status.

Population Distribution and Internal Migration

While immigrants have contributed to the growth and diversity of the U.S. population, the destinations chosen by these newcomers have also influenced the geographic distribution of the population. However, this distribution is mostly shaped by the natural increase (births minus deaths) of different regions and by the movement of people within our national boundaries.

Historical trends

In colonial times, U.S. population, exclusive of American Indians, was hud-

Figure 11. Center of U.S. Population: 1790-1980

Source: Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1981*, 1981

Figure 12. Percent of People Moving, by Age and Type of Move: 1975-1980



Source: Bureau of the Census, "Geographic Mobility: March 1975 to March 1980" *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 368, 1981, Table 4.

[a]Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. For definition, see text page 29.

dled along the eastern seaboard. Then, in what has become our most enduring migration trend, the population began to work its way west, as graphically shown by shifts in the "center of population" indicated by each census (see Figure 11). This center is the point where a rigid map of the country would balance if equal weights, each representing the location of one person in the population, were placed on it. Starting east of Baltimore in 1790, this point has migrated nearly due west, hugging the 39th latitude until 1960 when it began to dip noticeably southward. In 1980, with due symbolism, the center of population crossed the Mississippi River, landing at a point 40 miles south-southwest of St Louis, Missouri.

This strong westward undercurrent has been accompanied by two other conspicuous population distribution trends. First, beginning in the 1820s, urban areas began to grow faster than rural areas. Second, following the Civil War, the South began to lose population through out-migration to the Northeast and North Central states, particularly among blacks and after both World Wars. In the 1970s, however, rural-to-urban net migration was unexpectedly and dramatically reversed, and what had been a trickle of net migration into the South in the 1960s, focused on Florida, suddenly became a flood.

Mobility of Americans

The image of Americans as a people "on the move"—held over from the era of frontier expansion to the west—is still true today. Recent Census Bureau surveys show that about one in every six Americans, or 16 to 17 percent of the population, moves annually.[45] While this includes all moves, even from one unit to another in the same apartment

Table 5. Components of Population Growth in Regions and

(Numbers in millions)

Regions and divisions	Population 1950	Population 1960	1950-1960 Percent change	1950-1960 Natural increase	1950-1960 Net migration
Northeast	39.5	44.7	+13.2	4.9	+ .3
New England	9.3	10.5	+12.8	1.2	+ .0
Middle Atlantic	30.2	34.1	+13.3	3.7	+ .3
North Central	44.5	51.6	+16.1	7.3	- .1
East North Central	30.4	36.2	+19.2	5.1	+ .7
West North Central	14.1	15.4	+ 9.5	2.2	- .8
South	47.2	55.0	+16.5	9.2	- 1.4
South Atlantic	21.2	26.0	+22.6	4.1	+ .6
East South Central	11.5	12.0	+ 5.0	2.0	- 1.5
West South Central	14.5	17.0	+16.6	3.0	- .6
West	19.6	28.1	+38.9	4.0	+3.8
Mountain	5.1	6.9	+35.1	1.2	+ .6
Pacific	14.5	21.2	+40.2	2.8	+3.3

Sources: 1950-1970: Bureau of the Census, "Revised Estimates of the Population of States and Components of Change," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, Nos. 304 (1965) and 460 (1971); 1970-1980: Bureau of the Census, *1980 Census, United States Summary: Final Population and Housing Unit Counts* (Advance Reports), PHC 80-V-1, 1981, Table 1.

building, and is down slightly from the pre-1976 average of 20 percent, it still supports the notion of a mobile population.

The likelihood of moving is not the same for everyone, however. Age, for example, is a key factor. As shown in Figure 12 (page 25), the peak of mobility occurs between the ages of 20 and 35, when several life-cycle events conducive to mobility are likely to occur. Among these are the completion of schooling, entry into the labor force, marriage, and the arrival of children and need for more spacious living quarters. Families tend to move less as children grow older, which reflects both parents' increasing economic stability and social ties and the wrench that moving means for older children.

Although people move less after age 30, the moves they do make are still caused mainly by family and economic changes, such as divorce, a spouse's death, job relocation, and retirement. Retirement migration has received considerable notice because much of it is focused on a few destinations with attractive environmental features. Conspicuous examples are Florida, Arizona, the Ozarks, and northern New England.[47]

From Figure 12 it can also be seen that the age pattern of moving is roughly the same for those moving within and between urban areas (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) as it is for movers as a whole.

Education and occupation are other factors influencing the tendency to move. On average, migrants are more highly educated than non-migrants and people with higher levels of education are more likely to move than those with less education. People in jobs demanding high skills tend to be more mobile than those with low skills, although there are exceptions, such as professionals tied to a local practice—physicians and lawyers, for example. For similar reasons, the self-employed tend to move less than salaried workers.

Divisions: 1950-1980

Population 1970	1960-1970 Percent change	1960-1970 Natural increase	1960-1970 Net migration	Population 1980	1970-1980 [a] Percent change	1970-1980 [a] Natural increase
49.0	+ 9.7	4.0	+ .3	49.1	+ .2	1.9
11.8	+12.7	1.0	+ .3	12.3	+ 4.2	.5
37.2	+ 8.7	3.0	+ .0	36.8	- 1.1	1.5
56.6	+ 9.6	5.7	- .8	58.9	+ 4.0	4.0
40.3	+11.1	4.2	- .2	41.7	+ 3.5	2.8
16.3	+ 6.0	1.5	- .6	17.2	+ 5.2	1.2
62.8	+14.2	7.2	+ .6	75.3	+20.0	5.1
30.7	+18.1	3.4	+1.3	36.9	+20.4	2.1
12.8	+ 6.3	1.5	- .7	14.7	+14.5	1.0
19.3	+14.0	2.4	- .0	23.7	+22.9	2.0
34.8	+24.1	3.9	+2.9	43.2	+23.9	3.3
8.3	+20.8	1.1	+ .3	11.4	+37.1	1.1
26.5	+25.1	2.8	+2.5	31.8	+19.8	2.2

[a]Net migration is omitted for 1970-1980 because it is not yet possible to allocate the 5.5 million higher-than-expected 1980 census count by region.

Regional population shifts

Regional population growth patterns have shifted in the past three decades, as can be seen from Table 5, which shows numbers and percent changes in population size for census regions and divisions, as indicated by the four census counts from 1950 through 1980.

While all four regions gained population in each of the three intervals between censuses, the West grew fastest, although its population increase dropped from 39 percent in the 1950s to 24 percent in the 1970s. The Pacific division within this region grew faster in the 1950s and 1960s, while the Mountain states seemed more attractive in the 1970s. (The map on page 2 shows census regions and divisions and the states within them.) The South, which has had the largest regional population at each census, experienced a decided shift in its ability to keep its native population and to attract new residents. Florida, in the South Atlantic division, has been a net recipient of migrants throughout the 30-year span. During the 1970s, the remainder of the South also grew through in-migration. Blacks were noticeable in this flow, reversing for the first time their historical exodus from the South. Between 1975 and 1980, 415,000 blacks moved into the South while 220,000 moved out.[48] Growth in the South was largely at the expense of the Northeast and North Central regions. The Northeast showed almost no growth in the 1970s and one of its divisions, the Middle Atlantic, actually lost population.

By 1980, for the first time, the population of the South and West exceeded that of the two northern regions. Early in the 1970s, it had been projected that the South and West would account for 60 percent of national population growth between 1970 and 1980 but they wound up with 92 percent. California, Texas, and Florida alone accounted for 42 percent of national growth in the 1970s. In 1980 (as in 1970), California was the

most populous state, with 23.7 million people—far ahead of second-place New York with 17.6 million.

Table 5 also shows shifts in the relative importance of natural increase and net migration as contributors to regional population growth. (Net migration is not shown for 1970-80 because there is as yet no way to allocate by region the 5.5 million higher-than-expected 1980 census count. The 5.5 million "excess" is due to some combination of differences in the coverage of the population in the 1970 and 1980 censuses and illegal immigration.[49]) During the baby boom of the 1950s, high fertility reduced the importance of net migration in regional population change. As the birth rate has fallen, so has the influence of natural increase in determining population distribution.

During the 1950s, the South still had higher fertility than other regions which made it possible for that region's population to grow by a high 17 percent despite a continuing net migration outflow. By the 1970s, the South's fertility rate had dropped close to that of the rest of the nation and, as with other regions, net migration had become a much more important component of the region's growth, particularly as the South shifted dramatically from its historical role as a net exporter of people to net importer.

Net in-migration has always been an extremely important factor in the growth of the West; in the 1950s, for example, the West gained almost as many people from net in-migration (3.8 million) as from natural increase (4.0 million). In contrast, the North Central region lost population through out-migration in the 1950s and 1960s and continued to do so in the 1970s, when the migration balance also turned negative for the Northeast region.

Cities and rural-urban migration

In 1790, only 5 percent of the U.S. population lived in urban areas—places with at least 2,500 inhabitants. After 1820, as industry became increasingly important and the demand for farm labor gradually diminished, urban areas began to grow faster than rural areas. But it was not until 1920 that this faster growth was translated into an urban majority. By 1980, 73 percent of the population—a 65 million people—lived in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas.

Cities grew both from natural increase and migration from rural areas, and were also the focus of immigration from abroad. The attraction of cities is closely related to economic opportunity. Migrants will leave an area with low wages and high unemployment in favor of one with high wages and low unem-

Table 6. Ten Most Populous Cities: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980

(Numbers in thousands)

	1950		1960		1970		1980	
Rank	City	Population	City	Population	City	Population	City	Population
1	New York	7,892	New York	7,782	New York	7,896	New York	7,071
2	Chicago	3,621	Chicago	3,550	Chicago	3,369	Chicago	3,005
3	Philadelphia	2,072	Los Angeles	2,479	Los Angeles	2,812	Los Angeles	2,967
4	Los Angeles	1,970	Philadelphia	2,003	Philadelphia	1,950	Philadelphia	1,688
5	Detroit	1,850	Detroit	1,670	Detroit	1,514	Houston	1,594
6	Baltimore	950	Baltimore	939	Houston	1,253	Detroit	1,203
7	Cleveland	915	Houston	938	Baltimore	906	Dallas	904
8	St. Louis	857	Cleveland	876	Dallas	844	San Diego	875
9	Washington	802	Washington	764	Indianapolis	794	Baltimore	787
10	Boston	801	St. Louis	750	San Diego	697	San Antonio	785

Sources: Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book*, 1952, 1962, 1977; 1980: Unpublished data from Bureau of the Census, Population Division.

ployment. During the era of rapid urban growth, this equation clearly worked in favor of the cities.

In the prosperous post-World War II years, the cities' population began sprawling into suburban rings. This changing urban pattern called for a new definition—the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. This includes a central city (or twin cities) of at least 50,000 people, the county in which it is located, and adjacent counties that are both metropolitan in character and socially and economically integrated with that city. There were 169 SMSAs in 1950, when this concept was first used, and 318 by 1980, with every state for the first time having at least one.

As cities continued to grow and age they became more difficult to administer; their industrial infrastructure became dated, labor costs mounted, and the environment deteriorated, especially after the flight of the middle class beyond reach of inner city tax collectors. Northern cities were also hit with substantial hikes in the cost of fuel needed to survive the cold winter months. As a result, all of the cities in the Northeast and North Central regions in the list of the nation's ten largest cities lost population between 1970 and 1980 (see Table 6). Cities in the southern tier from Florida to California continued to grow. In 1950, only one of the top ten cities—Los Angeles—was located in this area. By 1980, five of the ten were in the South and West: Los Angeles, Houston, Dallas, San Diego and San Antonio.

In the 1970s, the urban scene was influenced by a new turn of events; for the first time in more than a century rural areas and small towns grew faster than urban areas. The population of nonmetropolitan counties increased 15.8 percent in the 1970s, compared to 11.4 percent for the country as a whole and only 9.8 percent for metropolitan counties. In the 1960s, nonmetropolitan population had increased only 4 percent, while that of metropolitan areas grew by 17 percent. As Table 7 shows, in the three five-year intervals from 1965 to 1980, nonmetropolitan areas received more migrants than they lost.

Table 7. Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Migration: 1965-1980

(Numbers in thousands)

Area	1965-70	1970-75	1975-80
Metropolitan			
In-migrants	5,457	5,127	5,993
Out-migrants	5,809	6,721	7,337
Net migration	− 352	−1,594	−1,344
Nonmetropolitan			
In-migrants	5,809	6,721	7,337
Out-migrants	5,457	5,127	5,993
Net migration	+ 352	+1,594	+1,344

Source: Bureau of the Census, "Geographic Mobility: March 1975 to March 1980," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 368, 1981, Table C.

Peter Morrison of the Rand Corporation cites several reasons for the revival of nonmetropolitan growth:[50]

- Improvements in transportation and communication, easing access to metropolitan economy;
- Decentralized manufacturing, capitalizing on low costs for land and labor;
- Increased activity in energy extraction;
- Life style considerations.

The downturn in net migration to nonmetropolitan areas in the second half of the 1970s leaves open the question of how long this renewed interest in rural alternatives will last (see speculations for the 1980s, page 42).

The migration of city dwellers to rural areas, coupled with the lesser tendency of natives to migrate to cities, does not represent a return to farming. In fact, the farm population declined by 25 percent between 1970 and 1980 and numbered only about 6 million in 1980.[51]

Population Age Composition

During the 1970s, "demographics" suddenly became a catchword from Madison Avenue to Capitol Hill. What caused

Figure 13. U.S. Population Age Composition: 1910, 1940,



Sources: Beth J. Soldo, "America's Elderly in the 1980s," *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1980) Figure 1; and Leon F. Bouvier, "America's Baby Boom Generation: The Fateful Bulge," *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1980) Figure 4.

this sudden concern with population numbers? Quite simply—changes in the fertility of U.S. couples. Drastic swings in American women's average number of births from the then-historic low of the 1930s to the baby boom peak in the 1950s and down to the new baby bust low of the 1970s have distorted the population's age distribution. This led in turn to serious disturbances in the social-economic system and thus to the discovery of "demographics" by those particularly involved with that system—businesses and government.

Consider, for example, the educational problems of the turbulent 1960s. Much of this stemmed from the baby boom of the 1950s and resulting growth in enrollments, first in elementary and then in secondary schools, and finally, by the late 1960s, in colleges. The successive student gluts were compounded by teacher shortages, partly due to the small number of births in the 1930s. In the current educational crisis, the demographic factors are reversed. Empty classrooms reflect the baby bust; unemployed teachers result from the high fertility of the baby boom era and the many members of that generation who opted for careers in education.

For both public and private policy and economic growth, a population's age composition is the most important demographic variable. An "older" population is less likely to exhibit growth than a "younger" population—everything else being equal.

Median age

An "older" or "younger" population is defined by median age—the point at which half the people are younger and half are older. Except for a brief period after World War II, the median age of the U.S. population has risen steadily from 23 in 1900 to 30 in 1980 and is likely to continue rising until well into the 21st century. The proportion of people in the oldest age bracket, 65 and over, increased from 4.1 percent in 1900 to 11.3 percent in 1980. Other such changes in the 20th century can be seen in Figure 13, which shows the population's age-sex composition in 1910, 1940, 1960, and as projected for 2000.

Changes in median age result from changes in the basic demographic variables: mortality, migration, and, especially, fertility. One might think of lower mortality as the major cause of a popu-

1960, 2000



Note: Projection for 2000 assumes a total fertility rate rising to 2.0 births per woman by 1985 and constant thereafter; life expectancy at birth rising to 72.8 years for males and 82.9 for females by 2050; net immigration constant at 750,000 persons per year.

lation's "aging," since mortality reductions increase the average age at death and this would increase the number of older people. But demographer Ansley Coale has demonstrated that the principal ingredient in a population's aging is not the average age at death but low fertility, which reduces the proportion of people in the younger ages and increases the proportions at older ages.[52] Indeed, lower mortality has produced a *younger* U.S. population than would otherwise have been the case, because typical improvements in health and medicine since the turn of the century have reduced mortality among the young and increased their numbers more than among the old. Today, death rates are so low among people up to age 40 that further mortality reductions would tend to occur among older people. This would increase the median age of the population. However, the impact would be relatively minor, as only a small proportion of the population can benefit from such improvements.

Immigration has also meant a younger U.S. population than otherwise would be the case because immigrants have been disproportionately young. Given current immigration trends, this influence on the population's age composition will continue.[53]

Cohort sizes

Like the median age of the population, the proportion of the population in each age-sex category is also affected by past and recent trends in mortality, migration, and especially fertility. Figure 14 reveals these effects in the age-sex

Figure 14. Population Age Composition: 1980



Source: Bureau of the Census

composition of the U.S. population in 1980. The bulge at ages 15-24 represents the survivors of the 43 million people born in the peak baby boom decade of 1955-1964. The much smaller proportions at ages 40-49 are the survivors among the 24 million people born in the 1930s depression decade, and the pinched-in base of the pyramid at ages 0-9 reflects the baby bust of 1970-79 when births totaled 33 million.

This situation of a large cohort surrounded by small cohorts is unique in U.S. history. It has already posed problems for U.S. society and will for years to come. By the mid-1980s, for example, the baby boom cohort will be at the peak of their reproductive years. Even if they have very small families as is now the case, annual births will increase in an echo "baby boomlet." Indeed, as noted earlier, annual births rose by half a million from the mid-1970s to 3.6 million in 1981. The total should surpass 4 million around 1990. A few years later, the number of children entering school will increase, leading to a demand for additional teachers and educational facilities at a time when teachers will be relatively scarce and little will have been done toward reopening old schools or constructing new ones. By contrast, the number of people aged 18-21 will be proportionately very small in 1990. Indeed, the population available for military service will be 25 percent smaller than in 1970.

Housing is already emerging as a serious problem related to cohort sizes. For numerous non-demographic reasons, housing construction in the U.S. is practically at a standstill. At the same time, however, millions of the baby boom generation are setting up households and searching for living quarters. The issue will also be complicated 20 years from now when the demand for housing declines as the baby bust generation attains maturity.

Still larger problems loom ahead when the baby boom generation reaches retirement age. In 2030, those born between 1955 and 1964 will be aged 65 to 74. They and their older counterparts will number well over 60 million and represent perhaps 20 percent of the U.S. population, compared to 26 million elderly persons today, making up 11 percent of the population. As Robert Samuelson recently wrote:

> "Health costs, which have doubled as a proportion of the nation's output in the past three decades, are almost certain to go higher—how much no one knows, though the possibilities are staggering. Those over 65 [already] account for nearly one-third of the nation's health bill. . . . Perhaps 30 percent of the federal budget—the largest single slice, bigger even than defense—goes toward spending for the elderly."[54]

To compound the problems, a much smaller proportion of the population—those born in the 1970s and 1980s—will be supporting this large elderly group. The potentials for inter-generational friction will be many and major disturbances could result. However, these should not be exaggerated. The elderly can only be 20 percent of the population if fertility remains low. If so, expenditures for children will decline along with their proportion of the population. As has been noted:

> "This will compensate for the increase in the elderly population. Rather than concentrating solely on the future population age 65 or older, economic planners should be looking at the total dependency ratio. Doing so yields a more complete picture."[55]

Clearly, the importance of a population's age composition must not be underestimated. The size of the U.S. population may not change dramatically over the next 50 years. However, the age composition of that population will change drastically, reflecting the wide fluctuations in fertility since the 1930s and to a lesser extent recent declines in mortality and increases in immigration. Together these all shape the U.S. population of the 1980s and the population of future years.

Six Demographic Surprises of the 1970s

Calvin L. Beale, *Leader, Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture*

(Calvin Beale, authority and prolific writer on the demography of rural America, was the first to point out the reversal in the 1970s of the U.S.'s historic rural-urban net migration stream in his article "Rural Development: Population and Settlement Prospects," Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, January/February 1974. He may also be the first to note that the demography of the U.S. in the 1970s can be characterized by this trend and five others that confounded projections. The Population Reference Bureau is pleased to present his perceptive observations in this Bulletin.*)*

It is instructive (and chastening) to review ways in which the course of American demographic trends deviated from what had been foreseen at the beginning of the 1970s despite the increased sophistication of projection models. To my mind, there were at least six major demographic surprises.

1. **The birth rate.** In 1971, the Bureau of the Census issued four projections of births for the 1970s, ranging from 40.1 to 49.3 million. Actual births for the decade proved to be only 33.2 million, 17 percent below the lowest projection, and 23 percent below the lowest widely accepted series. Deferred marriage and childbearing and increased abortion all contributed to produce this result.

2. **The death rate.** In the same Census Bureau projections, deaths for the decade were forecast at about 21 million. The observed number was 19.3 million. Life expectancy was projected to increase by only half a year; instead it rose by 3.4 years. Major gains were made in reducing mortality from heart disease and strokes.

3. **Household size.** A third surprise of the 1970s was the accelerated decline in average household size. In 1970 the average was 3.14 persons per household. In 1968, the Bureau of the Census issued eight projections, the lowest of which for 1980 was 2.83 persons per household, but the two most favored series ranged from 3.08 to 3.19 persons. By 1980, however, actual average household size had plummeted to 2.76 persons. In particular, the creation of small nonfamily households and one-parent households had proceeded far more rapidly than had been foreseen.

4. **The regional shift in population.** Migration to the South and West in the 1970s proved much greater than expected. The most ambitious set of regional projections was a seven-volume work prepared by the Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA) in 1972. Population growth in the Southern New England, Mid-Atlantic, and East North Central states from 1970 to 1980 was only 1.1 million against a projected 7.6 million, whereas the West grew by double the predicted rate (8.3 vs. 4.0 million) and the South rose by three-fifths more than expected (12.5 million vs. 7.8 million.)

5. **Growth of nonmetropolitan population.** Perhaps the most surprising trend of all was the revival of rural and small town population growth. No one seems to have been on record as forecasting the nonmetropolitan growth rate to be higher than the metropolitan rate in the 1970s. The BEA projection, referred to above, foresaw metropolitan growth of 11.4 percent and nonmetropolitan of 5.3 percent. Instead, metropolitan countries grew by 9.8 percent, but nonmetropolitan growth was 15.8 percent, or triple the projected rate.

6. **The role of illegal and refugee immigration.** By its nature, illegal immigration is difficult to estimate, much less to predict. Whatever its true amount, the consensus seems to be that it rose to major proportions during the 1970s, and became a significant factor in population growth. A further source of unanticipated growth was the influx of refugees—Indochinese in particular.

It is not my point in recounting these surprises to imply criticism of the forecasters, although I think some is merited in particular cases. I view the problem as generic. The demand for projections is insatiable. But, the ability to project inflections and changes in human behavior is limited—and will probably continue to be so.

Education, Income, Employment

This section takes a look at recent trends in Americans' educational attainment, school enrollment, and fields of study; the incomes they earn; and the changing pattern of the labor force, including the recent rise in both employment and unemployment rates.

Educational attainment and school enrollment

Educational levels continued to rise in the 1970s; among adults aged 25 or over, the proportion of high school graduates rose from 55 percent to 69 percent between 1970 and 1980 and those with four or more years of college increased from 11 percent to 17 percent.[56] In general, women are as likely as men to complete high school, but in 1980, substantially more men (21 percent) than women (14 percent) had at least four years of college—a wider gap than in 1970 when the figures were 14 percent for men and 8 percent for women. Among blacks over age 25, 51 percent had completed high school and 8 percent had finished college by 1980, but the proportions were much higher among blacks aged 25-34 (76 percent and 13 percent, respectively). Black women are more likely than black men to finish high school and college.

Blacks are more likely than whites to drop out of high school but the gap narrowed in the 1970s. Among people aged 14-24, high school dropout rates rose for whites from 11 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 1979, but dropped from 22 percent to 17 percent for blacks.[57]

As a result of the post-baby boom fertility decline, about 6.5 million fewer children were enrolled in elementary school in October 1980 than in 1970. However, enrollment increased by 890,000 in nursery school and 2.8 million in college.[58] College enrollment has tripled since 1960, from 3.6 million to 11.4 million in 1980. In 1965, only 38 percent of college students were women, but by 1980, women (6.0 million) outnumbered men (5.4 million). College enrollment of blacks nearly doubled between 1970 and 1980. In 1980, the approximately 1 million blacks in college represented about 10 percent of all students.

Harold M. Lambert

By 1980, 17 percent of adults had completed college, up from 11 percent in 1970.

Fields of study

Since the mid-1960s, there have been large gains in the proportion of students majoring in such fields as business, health, and biological sciences, while the proportion in education declined (reflecting the decline in the need for teachers).[59] Business was the most popular "major" for both men and women in the late 1970s.

Women have been moving from traditional fields of study (education, health, English, liberal arts) into more lucrative male-dominated fields. By the late 1970s, women made up 40 percent of all business majors. However, in 1978, they still captured only 22 percent of medical degrees, 26 percent of law degrees, and 11 percent of dentistry

degrees, and are still severely underrepresented in engineering.

Education and income

The more years of school completed, the more money people earn. Completing four or more years of college, for example, meant mean earnings of $23,833 for men in 1979, compared to $14,375 for men who had only completed high school and $11,481 for men who left school after eight years of elementary school (see Figure 15). There is a vast difference, however, in the amounts earned by men and women, as also seen in Figure 15. The mean earnings of women with four or more years of college in 1979 was a trifling $10,696 —less than the income of male elementary school graduates. Women with a high school education earned $6,750, on average—more than $2,000 below the average for men with fewer than eight years of elementary school ($8,910).

Income

Although the U.S. is still among the world's wealthiest countries, its gross national product (GNP) per capita in 1980—$11,360—ranked only 14th in that year.[60] Nine European countries ranked higher—fourth-place Switzerland with $16,440, for example, and West Germany in sixth place with $13,590—and three tiny, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries led the list: United Arab Emirates ($30,070), Qatar ($26,080), and Kuwait ($22,840).

In 1980, the median income of all U.S. families was $21,023: $21,904 for white families and $12,674 for black

Figure 15. Mean Earnings of Men and Women, by Educational Attainment: 1979

(Persons with income, aged 18 and over)



Source: Bureau of the Census, "Money Income of Families and Persons in the United States: 1979," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 129, 1981, Table 53.

families.[61] After adjusting for inflation, the real median income of families rose only 4 percent between 1974 and 1979 and actually dropped by 5.5 percent between 1979 and 1980. This is the largest annual decline since World War II. The slow growth in real family income during the 1970s was due, in part, to the increase in families headed by women with no husband present—from 11 percent in 1970 to 15 percent in 1980. About 24 percent of such families had incomes of less than $5,000 in 1979, compared with 4 percent of families with both husband and wife present.[62] At the upper end of the scale, 40 percent of married-couple families earned $25,000 or more, but only 9 percent of families headed by women with no husband present. Both spouses had incomes in more than three-fourths of married-couple families. In 1979, 7 percent of all families made under $5,000 and 30 percent had incomes between $25,000 and $49,999. Almost one-fifth of black families earned less than $5,000.

Accompanying the sharp decline in real median family income between 1979 and 1980 was an increase in the number of persons below the poverty level from 26.1 million, or 11.7 percent of the population, to 29.3 million, or 13 percent of the population. This was one of the largest annual increases in the number of poor since 1959 when poverty statistics were first computed. (The poverty level is set according to family size and rural or urban residence and was $8,414 for a nonfarm family of four in 1980. The index is based solely on cash income. According to a study released by the Census Bureau in April 1982, if noncash benefits such as Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and housing aid were included in the calculation, the poverty rate in 1979 would have been 6.4 to 9.8 percent instead of 11.7 percent.[63])

In 1980, the poverty rate for whites (10.2 percent) was substantially lower than the rate for blacks (32.5 percent) and persons of Spanish origin (25.7 percent). Among the elderly, aged 65 and over, 38 percent of blacks, 31 percent of Hispanics, and 14 percent of whites were classified as poor. The elderly group with the largest proportion of poor are women who do not live with relatives. As in other years, the 1980 poverty rate was higher in the South (16.5 percent) than in the North and West (11.3 percent).

At the other end of the spectrum, the top 1 percent of persons in the U.S. own about 21 percent of all personal wealth, a proportion that has fluctuated between 20 and 26 percent since 1945.

Labor force

Composition. The U.S. labor force is employed in a vast mix of occupations that together comprise the national economy. The composition of employment has been shifting during at least the last 40 years from manufacturing and agricultural labor into service industries, a category that includes everything from auto repair and health services to hotel chains and education. This shift has been experienced by most industrialized Western countries.

While the total number of employed persons grew 47 percent between 1962 and 1981, manufacturing employment grew by only 24 percent (from 17.6 million to 21.8 million) and the number employed in agriculture actually shrank by 35 percent (from 5.2 million to 3.4 million). Meanwhile, employment in services grew by 84 percent (from 16.0 million to 29.5 million), and now accounts for 29 percent of all U.S. employment (see Figure 16).

The shift toward services, while a continuous trend, has accelerated since 1970. This trend is attributed to, among other things, a demand for social services and other "human capital" industries, including education, and an increase in workers who tend to choose service-type careers, especially women, who have been entering the labor force

Figure 16. Employment by Economic Sector: 1962 and 1981



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Agriculture includes forestry and fisheries.

in increasing numbers.

These shifts in occupation have had social and even political consequences. For example, regions of the U.S. that have been preeminent in manufacturing or agriculture have tended to suffer as these industries have been eclipsed by newer ones. Also union membership has dropped, from 33 percent of all wage-earning or salaried workers in 1958 to 24 percent in 1978.

Size and growth of the labor force. In 1978 the U.S. labor force passed the 100 million mark for the first time in history and in 1981, an average of 108.7 million people were working or looking for work. The U.S. labor force has been growing twice as fast as the population as a whole since the mid-1960s. In 1960, 59 percent of the population aged 16 and over was in the labor force. By 1981, the proportion was up to 64 percent and it is projected to reach 68 percent by 1990.[64]

What factors have caused this unprecedented labor force growth? The main reason is the arrival at working ages of the baby boom generation, born between 1947 and 1964. Also, women's labor force participation has risen dramatically. In 1960, 38 percent of women 16 years and over were working or looking for work; by March 1982, this had jumped to just over 52 percent.[65] (Over the same period, male labor force participation rates fell from 83 percent to 76 percent.)

Now, however, the main bulge of the baby boom generation has entered the working ages (16 and over). So the growth of the working population is expected to slow during the 1980s and early 1990s as the number of people reaching working ages each year actually decreases. Further, it is expected that women's participation in the labor force will continue to increase, but not at the revolutionary rate of the 1970s.

Women in the labor force. In March 1982, women made up 43 percent of the total labor force, compared to 33 percent in 1960.

During the 1950s and 1960s, women still tended to drop out of the labor force while their children were young. But in the 1970s, the employment rate of women aged 25-34—the prime ages for childbearing and early childrearing—went up by more than half, from 46 percent in 1970 to 67 percent in March 1981. Nearly 48 percent of married mothers of preschool children under age six were working in March 1981, compared to 12 percent in 1950.[66]

Women have made inroads into many traditionally male professions. To cite some widely divergent occupations: 64 percent of computer and peripheral equipment operators were women as of 1981, compared to 38 percent in 1972.

Figure 17. Unemployment Rates by Group: 1970-March 1982



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Fifty-eight percent of insurance adjusters, examiners and investigators were women as of 1981, compared to 34 percent in 1972. Forty-seven percent of bus drivers were women as of 1981, compared to 34 percent in 1972. And 14 percent of lawyers and judges were women as of 1981, compared to 4 percent in 1972.[57]

Other professions remain predominantly male, with little increase in the proportions of women: for example, 14 percent of physicians were women in 1981, compared to 9 percent in 1972, and the proportion of female auto mechanics rose only from 0.5 percent in 1972 to 0.6 percent in 1981. A large proportion of occupations still seem to fall predominantly to one sex or the other.

Unemployment. This statistic is a function of the prosperity of the U.S. economy. It never reaches zero percent. A decade ago, an unemployment rate of about 4 percent of the total labor force was considered to be so low that it constituted, for all practical purposes, "full employment." Such a low figure has not been recorded since 1969. In recent times, factors pushing unemployment figures upward—9 percent in March 1982—have included the increased entrance of women into the labor force, as well as the entrance of greater and greater numbers of the baby boom generation; youth are most likely to be unemployed. So the unemployment rate of 5.6 percent recorded in 1972 and 1974 is the lowest in the decade (see Figure 17).

Women's unemployment rate is typically higher than men's—about 12 per-

cent to 45 percent higher over the past decade. In 1978, for example, the rate was 7.2 percent for women and 5.2 percent for men. However, in 1981 and 1982 the disparity between men's and women's unemployment rates has narrowed dramatically and in March 1982 the rate was identical for both men and women. This coincidence may be a result of the 1981-1982 recession, in which those industries hardest hit (construction, auto manufacturing) happen to be those employing large proportions of males.

Unemployment during recent years has tended to be twice as high for blue-collar workers as for white-collar workers (and even higher during a recession); twice as high for blacks as for whites; two-and-a-half or three times as high as the national average for youths 16-19 in the labor force; and for black youth, five or six times as high as the national average.

What's in Store for U.S. Population Trends in the 1980s?

Continued low fertility and declining mortality, slowdowns in rising rates of divorce and nonmarital cohabitation, somewhat less mobility and internal migration, and increases in both legal and illegal immigration—these are among the predictions of five population experts for the rest of the decade.

At a February 17, 1982, seminar at the Population Reference Bureau in Washington, D.C., called to consider "What's in store for U.S. population trends in the 1980?" the five experts bravely voiced their expectations that most current trends will continue, if moderated in some cases. None foresaw surprises in the decade ahead to rival the 1970s turnaround in net rural-to-urban migration, the tripling of the number of unmarried couples living together, the surge in refugees and illegal immigration, and the faintness of the baby boom echo. However, they also agreed, as one panelist put it, that "many questions asked of demographers are not knowable." Among the "unknowables" that could affect U.S. demographic trends in the 1980s are: the outcome of current cutbacks in social welfare programs and "new federalism" proposals to shift responsibility for many such programs to individual states, the depth and duration of the current economic recession, and new immigration legislation. Energy shortages and technological innovations could affect demographic trends over the long run.

The five panelists, who spoke in their private capacity on their fields of expertise, are:

Calvin Beale *(Leader, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture)*—internal migration;
Leon Bouvier *(Director, Demographic Research and Policy Analysis, Population Reference Bureau)*—international migration;
Paul Glick *(Senior Demographer, Population Division, Bureau of the Census, retired)*—marriage, divorce, and household composition;
Marilyn McMillen *(Statistician, Social Security Administration)*—mortality;
Martin O'Connell *(Chief, Fertility Statistics Branch, Population Division, Bureau of the Census)*—fertility.
Jacob Siegel *(Senior Statistician, Demographic Research and Analysis, Bureau of the Census)* served as moderator.

Following are highlights of their predictions, including their responses to questions from the overflow audience:

Changes in Cohort Sizes (Siegel)

Warning of coming changes in cohort sizes that result from past fluctuations in numbers of births is the main contribution demographers can make to planning for changes in

such areas as school enrollment, labor force participation, and marketing. The changes to prepare for in the 1980s are: a small increase in the 0-14 age group and a drop in the 15-29 age group, reflecting the birth rate decline of the 1960s and 1970s; a sharp increase in the group aged 30-44—the baby boom generation; a decline in numbers of persons aged 55-64, reflecting the birth decline from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s; and a moderate increase in the number of elderly, aged 65 and over.

Fertility (O'Connell)

Assuming no major changes in contraceptive technology and availability of abortion and family planning services, period fertility will continue low during the 1980s, fluctuating between 1.8 and 2.1 births per woman. Although women in the childbearing ages are projected to reach a record 55 million by the mid-1980s, annual births should peak at 3.9 to 4 million in the decade and then decline.

Continued delayed marriage will keep fertility rates low for teenagers and women in their early twenties, although cutbacks in publicly funded family planning and abortion services could alter the proportion of premaritally conceived, but legitimated, births compared to the proportion of out-of-wedlock births among women of these ages. Fertility rates among women aged 25-34 will continue their recent slight rise, especially among urban, highly educated, professional women who have been delaying marriage and childbearing. However, birth rates among women in their thirties will continue at about half the level of rates for women in their twenties.

The fertility rate of black women will continue about 30 percent higher than the rate for white women, as it has for the past 50 years. Migration might narrow regional differences in the crude birth rate, but in 1990, as in 1980, the birth rate is likely to be highest in the West, where both economic growth and proportions of people in the childbearing ages are currently highest.

The first wave of baby boom women, born between 1946 and 1950 and now in their early to mid-thirties, will have had about 2 children per woman, on average, and 15 percent will still be childless when their childbearing is ended about 1990. Women now in their twenties, born in the 1950s and early 1960s, will probably complete their childbearing with 1.8 to 2.0 children per woman and as many as 20 to 25 percent could remain childless. In Census Bureau surveys, women aged 18-24 now report that they expect eventually to have slightly more children than this (2.0 births each, on average) and that only 11 percent will remain childless. Currently, however, two-thirds of this age group are still single and since 1976, when the Census Bureau began collecting birth expectations data for single women, women aged 18-24 who have remained single have been revising their expectations downward. Marriage is the big unknown for single women in responding to survey questions on birth expectations.

Mortality (McMillen)

Death rates will continue to decline in the 1980s as they did from 1968 to 1978 when the age-adjusted mortality rate fell from 7-8 deaths per 1,000 population—the level at which it had hovered between 1954 and 1968—to 6 deaths per 1,000 population. This latest mortality decline reflects the combined effects of changes in life style—improved diets, more exercise, less smoking, etc.—and increased access to medical screening and care.

In 1978, life expectancy at birth was 69.5 years for U.S. males and 77.2 for females. By the end of the 1980s, males will pass the 70-year mark and females will reach 80, according to most federal and private researchers. Projections made by the Social Security Office of the Actuary in 1981, the latest available, show male life expectancy at 71.9

in 1990 and 72.9 in the year 2000, and female life expectancy at 80.0 in 1990 and 81.1 in 2000.

That mortality will continue to decline is supported by international comparisons which show that there is still room for improvement in U.S. mortality levels: internationally, U.S. males ranked 18th and females ranked 9th in life expectancy in 1975. Except for infant mortality, the decline in death rates may very well continue even if the 1980s see a repeat of the great depression of the 1930s, predicted Siegel, also an expert in mortality, in response to a question from the floor. Health conditions did not deteriorate in the 1930s and mortality declined far more than it did during the period of maximum expansion of public health programs in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Siegel said.

McMillen predicted a continued narrowing of the racial gap in mortality for the 1980s, reflecting the faster fall in death rates for nonwhites than for whites that resumed as general mortality began to decline again about 1968. Similarly, improvements in female mortality have slowed somewhat compared to the gains for males since 1968, so that the sex differential in mortality is likely at least to stablilize in the 1980s, rather than continuing to widen as it did from 1900 to 1968.

Marriage, Divorce, and Household Composition (Glick)

In 1982, the number of people in the ages where first marriages generally occur—18-25 for women and 20-27 for men—has peaked. As the numbers go down, numbers of first marriages should also decline gradually, although the "marriage squeeze" will reverse to favor easier marriage for women—i.e. by 1990, there will be 5 percent more men than women in the main ages of first marriage compared to the 10 percent excess of women in the mid-1960s.

Delayed first marriages may increase during the 1980s, but 8 to 10 percent of women now in their twenties will never marry, compared with only 4 percent of women who were in their twenties during the 1950s. These delayed marriages would involve more of the large numbers of people born at the end of the baby boom; thus, the median age at first marriage should continue to rise moderately in the 1980s. Deteriorating economic conditions could contribute to continuing declines in the rates of first marriage and remarriage.

Annual divorces will continue to rise during the 1980s until the number of persons in the main age range for divorce (25-40) reaches a peak around 1990. However, the rise in divorces should moderate, partly because the increase in women's employment—a prime, though indirect, factor in divorce—is also likely to slow.

Changing norms are speeding up the time between first marriage and divorce and between divorce and remarriage. This increases the likelihood of second divorces and third marriages.

Marriage and divorce rates are lowered by the steep rise in the number of unmarried couples living together, which tripled from 523,000 in 1970 to 1.8 million in 1981. This number will still rise steeply but may not triple again in the 1980s. By 1990, however, unmarried couples should constitute 7 percent of all couple households, compared to 3.5 percent in 1981.

During the 1980s, the number of households will again increase far more than the total U.S. population (21 versus 9 percent). However, the annual addition is projected to peak at 1.8 million in 1982 and decline to 1.6 million in 1990. Some 43 percent of the 1980s increase in households will occur among nonfamily households, now about one-fourth of all households. Nine-tenths of nonfamily households are currently persons living alone; unmarried couples constitute over one-half of the remainder.

Mean household size was 3.14 persons in 1970, 2.76 in 1980, and is expected to de-

cline to 2.47 in 1990. Most of the decline will be due to fewer children under age 18.

The proportion of children under 18 living with one parent will continue to increase, reaching 25 percent in 1990 compared to 20 percent in 1980.

The gap between median incomes of black and white families, which stabilized in the 1970s, could widen again in the 1980s because of rising unemployment which particularly affects black families, a large proportion of which are headed by women at the lower end of the employment scale.

Internal Migration (Beale)

Gross mobility—the proportion of people changing households in a year—may drop to 16-17 percent in the 1980s, or slightly below the recent American "standard" of 20 percent. This will be due to a diminishing supply of people in the prime moving ages (22-25), which is at a peak in 1982 (reflecting the peak baby boom years of 1957 and 1961), the high cost and inadequate supply of housing, and the preponderance of two-earner families, which inhibits migration. Migration may be little affected by the shift of social welfare responsibilities to states ("new federalism") if that comes to pass, because migration rates are generally low among people entirely dependent on social security, e.g., welfare and unemployment insurance. However, less state support for people with economic problems might stimulate migration to areas promising more jobs.

The population shift to the South and West will continue, but not accelerate as it did in the 1970s. Movement to the North cannot be reduced much further, but substantial outmovement is still possible from many northern industrial areas. Growth is also likely to be slow in similar areas in the South, e.g., Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and the Carolinas. Migration will continue rapid to the Mountain states of the West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming). Coal gasification and more complex forms of oil extraction (e.g., from shale) should provide continued impetus to mining-related migration. However, most population boom areas will still be related to resort-retirement growth and suburbanization. Diminishing water supplies will eventually restrain population growth in the West, but not yet in the1980s.

The net flow of migration from urban areas to small towns and rural areas—a demographic surprise of the 1970s—will continue until popular perceptions of life in large urban areas improve and/or the ideological underpinning of the shift to small communities weakens (environmentalism, counter-culture values, homesteading, etc.). However, the size of the net flow may lessen in the 1980s, because some of the bloom is off the economic surge that facilitated nonmetropolitan population growth in the 1970s; unemployment rates are now higher and job growth has been lower since 1978 in nonmetropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas. But higher energy costs for transportation are not a limiting factor in nonmetropolitan growth.

International Migration (Bouvier)

The doubling of Mexico's young adult population over the next 20 years and continuing improvements in transportation and communication are among the forces that will keep the potential for migration to the U.S. at a high pitch during the 1980s. How many will actually enter depends partly on legislation which is unlikely to change substantially during the decade with reference to the three principal types of immigration—legal immigration, refugees, and illegal immigration.

In 1980, some 800,000 people entered the U.S. legally under the limited or unlimited categories for legal immigration or as refugees. The 270,000 slots currently available in the limited category will remain unchanged. Beyond that, however, are those unlimited categories which consist of spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens, parents of U.S.

citizens aged 21 and over, and small special groups, such as former U.S. citizens who wish to return to the U.S. The number admitted in these categories was about 130,000 per year until recently, rose to 151,000 in 1980, and is likely to increase substantially to between 200,000 and 250,000 per year during the 1980s as the large number of refugees become legal residents and many opt for citizenship after four years as legal residents and begin bringing in close relatives under the categories now exempt from numerical restrictions. This would bring the total of legal immigrants in the limited and unlimited categories to 470,000 to 520,000 a year. These estimates are considerably higher than the limit in the immigration reform bill recently introduced in the Congress which recommends an upper limit of 425,000 legal immigrants a year, *including* those presently entering under the categories exempt from the 270,000 numerical restriction.

Current legislation permits 50,000 refugee admissions a year. The number can be raised by executive order in consultation with Congress and has been around 200,000 in recent years; 140,000 slots are allocated for 1982. Although political turmoil continues to erupt around the globe, refugee levels are likely to fall to between 75,00 and 100,000 in the next few years because of Americans' increasing resistance to large numbers of refugees.

As refugees may apply for legal residence status after one year in this country, care must be taken not to double-count these people—first as refugees and second when they become legal residents. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) only records them as they become legal residents under the numerically exempt status. The predictions above for the exempt category do not include refugees who adjust their status. It does take into consideration the fact that when refugees eventually acquire citizenship, they are in a position to sponsor their immediate relatives for entrance as legal immigrants under that same exempt category.

Illegal immigration will probably increase somewhat during the 1980s. The urge to migrate remains high in the Latin American and Caribbean countries where most illegals originate; the young adult population is growing rapidly and unemployment has not been reduced. On the U.S. side, a consensus about limiting illegal immigration seems to be emerging. On the other hand, many businesses benefit from employing illegals; the administration is concerned with, among other things, maintaining smooth relations with Mexico and other countries for whom illegal migration represents a safety valve. Also, enforcement of laws curbing illegal immigration will not be easy. Past levels of illegal immigration are unknown; estimates range from 100,000 to half a million a year. Forced to pick a number for the coming years, Bouvier estimated between 350,000 and 500,000 a year.

The sum of the various categories of immigrants comes to about 900,000 a year under the low assumptions and just over 1.1 million under the high assumptions (see Table 8, page 44). Subtracting emigration of legal residents estimated at 100,000 to 150,000 annually (following estimates by Robert Warren and Jennifer Peck of the Census Bureau) results in a prediction of net immigration for the 1980s ranging from three-quarters of a million to almost one million a year.

Immigration at these levels rules out the possibility of reaching a quasi-stationary population in the near future and promises a change in the makeup of U.S. society that presents Americans with a challenge similar to that of the large numbers of European immigrants who entered at the beginning of the 20th century. Today's base population is far larger than it was then, but by 1990 Hispanics will comprise a significant minority of 10 percent of the population. Siegel observed that the problems of adjustment for the immigrants of today could be greater than at the turn of the century, because the cultural gap between Hispanics and the many immigrants from Asia and the present U.S.

population is wider than it was between the earlier West and East European immigrants, and, unlike those earlier immigrants, Hispanics in particular appear to want to preserve their own culture and language, rather than assimilating.

Table 8. Projections of Annual Migration to the U.S. in the 1980s: Leon Bouvier

Type of migration	Low assumptions	High assumptions
Legal—Limited	270,000	270,000
Unlimited[a]	200,000	250,000
Refugees[b]	75,000	100,000
Illegal	350,000	500,000
Gross migration, total	895,000	1,120,000
Minus emigration of legal residents	100,000	150,000
Net migration, total	795,000	970,000

[a]Exempt from legal migration numerical limitations: spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens and parents of U.S. citizens aged 21 and over.

[b]Refugees adjust their status to legal immigrants after one or two years. They are only counted as "refugees" in these estimates.

Prospects for Future Growth

U.S. population growth has been spurred in the recent past by both the high birth rates of the baby boom era and by immigration. Together these factors have given the U.S. a rate of growth about four times higher than those of the industrialized countries of Northern and Western Europe. Yet the 1970s witnessed a decline in the U.S. fertility rate to a level nearly as low as that of Western Europe. If the fertility rate remains low, U.S. population growth could be expected to follow the "European model" to eventual zero, and then negative, growth. But one major spur to population growth will remain: immigration. The U.S., along with Australia and Canada, has been an important "receiving" country in the more developed world for immigrants and refugees. No other country takes in more new residents on a regular basis.

What would U.S. population size be in the future if no immigration were allowed? If our fertility rate remains below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, U.S. population size would eventually begin to decline, as Austria's and West Germany's already have. With a total fertility rate of 1.8 children per woman (0.1 child below the current rate) and no immigration, U.S. population would begin declining just before 2030, and by 2080 would be about 202 million, approximately the level at the time of the 1970 census (see Table 9, top panel). But if we add half a million immigrants a year (somewhat above the annual net *legal* immigration average of 420,000 in the 1970s) while fertility remains at 1.8 children per woman, the population would begin to decline only about 2050 and would be about 268 million in 2080 (Table 9, panel 2, and Figure 18, page 46).

But what if fertility does not remain at this low level? While the birth rate may not rise much in the future, even rather small changes can have large long-term effects. Even if immigration were zero, U.S. population could still

Table 9. Projected U.S. Population Size, by Total Fertility Rate and Net Annual Immigration: 2000, 2030, 2050, 2080

(Numbers in millions)

Total fertility rate	Year			
	2000	2030	2050	2080
No immigration				
1.8	243.7	244.8	227.3	201.6
2.0	250.3	267.8	265.9	260.8
2.2	257.7	295.0	311.6	341.3
Annual net immigration = 500,000				
1.8	255.5	277.6	274.1	268.2
2.0	262.3	302.1	315.0	335.1
2.2	269.9	331.0	365.6	425.1
Annual net immigration = 750,000				
1.8	261.3	294.1	297.5	301.5
2.0	268.3	319.2	340.0	372.2
2.2	276.0	349.0	392.6	467.1
Annual net immigration = 1 million				
1.8	267.1	310.4	320.9	334.8
2.0	274.2	336.3	365.1	409.3
2.2	282.1	367.0	416.6	509.1

Source: Leon F. Bouvier, *The Impact of Immigration on U.S. Population Size*, Population Trends and Public Policy Series No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1981) Table 2.

Note: These projections assume a base 1980 U.S. population of 222 million, about 4.5 million below the actual April 1, 1980, census count of 226.5 million (which was announced only on January 1, 1981, after the projections were prepared). Adjustment for this discrepancy would not significantly change the projections shown here.

reach 260 million by 2080 if women had 2.0 children, on average, instead of 1.8 (top panel, Table 9). And with no immigration, but above-replacement fertility of 2.2 children per woman (as some demographers are now predicting for future decades), the population would top the 340 million mark by 2080!

Perhaps the one aspect that sets the U.S. apart from other developed countries so far as future population size is concerned is the complete uncertainty as to what that size will be. While fertility rates of some low-fertility European countries might well rise somewhat, only the U.S. must also try to deal with such potentially large numbers of immigrants in projecting its future size. With an annual net immigration of 750,000 (close to Bouvier's low assumptions for the 1980s described in the preceding section) and 2.0 children per woman, U.S. population could be about 372 million by 2080; with net annual immigration of one million (just over Bouvier's high assumptions) and fertility of 2.2 children per woman, the figure goes over 500 million (see bottom two panels of Table 9 and Figure 18). While a few other developed countries have moderately high immigration *rates*, no other country accepts such large *numbers* of immigrants. Thus, it is possible to speculate about future U.S. population size using very reasonable assumptions about future fertility rates and immigration—both legal and illegal—and be *wrong by several hundred million.*

In looking to the future, we must also keep in mind that the world of the next hundred years will be vastly different from that of the past hundred. The stage of international relations will be joined by more and more actors—many with nuclear clout. The people of the United States can no longer make decisions independently, cushioned by the safety of geographic isolation and a strong economy. Political unrest, caused in part by the strain of development in Third World nations, may increase the numbers of refugees seeking asylum. The increasing interdependence of the world economy will affect us all, including our decisions about family size.

Early population growth in the U.S. was essentially a product of a vibrant nation, needing a population to develop its seemingly limitless resources. Both the causes of future population growth and our policy toward it will be very different from the past. How we handle them will determine the future of the U.S. □

Figure 18. U.S. Population Size, 1950-1980, and Three Scenarios for 1990-2080



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

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